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ONTARIO’S NEW FUNDING FORMULA – AN EVALUATION

Ontario’s new funding formula is, of course, new. To be implemented in January 2025.  So, everyone is feeling around it like the proverbial seven blind men around the elephant.  There are different opinions depending upon which part you are touching.

What we do know for sure is that this is a cost-based funding formula, seeking to take into account the different cost situations facing different child care centres.  It will replace the revenue-replacement model which began in March 2022, which was based only on what parent fees were charged by a centre, not on their costs.  For many centres, the revenue-replacement model failed to cover true costs, driving centres into debt as a result, or forcing them to close rooms.

This evaluation is based only on the funding formula for child care centres, not for home child care.

THE FUNDING FORMULA – A THUMBNAIL SKETCH

Ontario’s new funding formula will deliver operational funding to centres that are in the $10 a day program (CWELCC).  Each centre will have to come up with a projected operating budget that identifies how many licensed spaces they have in each age group, how many of these spaces will be operational in the coming year, whether the centre is located in a community space or a school, the location of the centre, and the number of days of operation for each age group per year.  These data will be fed into a funding formula to determine how much revenue the centre will receive for operations in the coming year (to cover wages, salaries and benefits of program staff and supervisors, food, accommodations, administration, materials and so on).    

The calculated numbers will be affected by the geographic location of the centre, with centres in Toronto getting a boost and many others having their calculated allocation reduced a bit.  This is intended to reflect differences in the costs of operation in different locations around the province.

If the spaces are existing spaces (part of the CWELCC $10 a day program as of August 14th, 2024) and the calculated revenues do not cover their projected costs, they will be eligible for a Legacy Top-Up to revenues.  As long as the centre can show that its projected costs reflect the (relatively high) legitimate historical costs of operating this centre, it will receive this extra revenue through a Legacy Top-Up.  New spaces are not eligible for a Legacy Top-Up, but they will get a Growth Top-Up.  A Growth Top-Up boosts up the amount calculated by the funding formula for new spaces, by different amounts based on geography.

A centre can spend its allocation on any eligible cost, and nearly all costs that are clearly related to the provision of quality child care for children will likely be eligible.

On top of this, there is an allocation for profit or surplus.  It’s called an “allocation in lieu of profit or surplus”. It’s about an 8.5% markup on top of other revenues.  For-profit centres will take this as profit.  Non-profits will take it as a surplus to be used to cover emergency shortfalls in the future or to cover expected repairs and maintenance, or to improve compensation and quality.

Service System Managers (SSMs) are the gatekeepers of the system.  They hand out funding according to submitted budget plans for the coming year.  They will adjudicate issues related to the “eligibility” of certain expenditures.  They will assess the reasonableness of expenditures in an annual cost-review process.  They will also continue to administer the child care subsidy system.  There will no longer be operating grants and wage enhancement grants for spaces that are part of the $10 a day system, but there will continue to be such grants for child care for children 6-12. 

For more details about how the new funding formula works, see my blog from September 23rd, 2024.

OK, on to the evaluation:

POSITIVES OF THE FUNDING FORMULA

Let’s emphasize the positives first.  The Ministry of Education has made a serious attempt to develop a cost-based funding formula – a funding formula that will cover the legitimate costs of operators seeking to provide quality services for children.  It begins the process of developing public management of child care operations with financial accountability for the money spent.  It is not perfect, as you will see below; there are some serious problems that remain.  But first, here are some of the positives:

  1. Finally, we are getting rid of the stopgap “revenue-replacement” funding model which was not based on the true costs of operating a child care facility, but was based on whatever your parent fees for children 0-5 happened to be on March 27, 2022.  For some centres – those who had kept fees low, or those who used higher school age fees to cross-subsidize parent fees for younger children, or those seeking to attract more staff – revenue-replacement was extremely unfair.  These centres went into deficit and many shut down rooms.  So, having a funding model which purports to be based on costs is a big step forward.

2. For those centres seeking to expand and licensees seeking to set up new centres, it is now possible to forecast what your annual revenues will be.  This is indispensable to support growth.

3. For centres that have historically had costs of operation that are higher than the Benchmark Allocation (what the Ministry believes the underlying costs of operation truly are), there is a Legacy Top-Up.  That means that these centres, for their existing spaces, will not go out of business.  Their costs (for existing spaces, but not new ones) will, apparently, be covered at their current level going forward.

4. For centres that have operating costs that are lower than the province’s Benchmark Allocation (apparently 50% of the centres in the province), they will have revenues that are greater than their costs (i.e., they will receive the Benchmark Allocation).  So, these centres could and should spend additional revenues on improving quality, including wages and benefits to attract and retain staff.  If they don’t fully spend their allocation, the surplus will be taken back at the end of the year.

5. There are important measures of financial accountability built into the new funding system – standardized financial reporting, audited financial statements, a cost review process at the SSM level for selected centres and agencies and an external compliance assessment process for a 5% sample of centres/agencies.  Financial accountability is a key aspect of public management.  If 90% of revenues are coming from government, we need to know that these revenues are being spent sensibly improving the lives of children and parents.

6. The new funding formula determines the total amount of revenue a centre will get, but gives a very large measure of flexibility to the centre on how it spends this money.  Instead of having multiple different spending envelopes generated by multiple different granting programs, nearly all centre operating revenues will be in one envelope.  This is positive, because we want centres to have the capability to tailor their programs to the character of their community and the needs of their children and families.  Centres should not have cookie-cutter programs – the same for everyone.  This funding formula enables diversity.

7. There is some limitation on the amount of revenues that can be taken out “in lieu of profit”.  There is a formula for the amount “in lieu of profit/surplus”.  This guarantees operators a minimum amount of profit or surplus but this is also a maximum.  I will have more to say about this below.

NEGATIVES

8. The funding formula is not based on a wage grid.  Instead, there is a wage floor for RECEs – currently $23.86 per hour.  A wage grid would establish wages to be paid to all certification levels of staff, including untrained staff, cooks, supervisors, etc., with increases in this hourly wage based on experience and qualification level.  Many Canadian jurisdictions now have wage grids. 

A wage grid is designed to attract and retain educators and other staff.  The absence of a wage grid means that paying low wages is an attractive competitive strategy for some operators – low wages will potentially leave them surplus revenue to spend in other ways.  For instance, for-profit operators could use these freed-up revenues to pay accelerated mortgage costs so that they end up owning child care assets sooner.

9. Geographic Adjustment Factors (GAFs) and Growth Multipliers (GMs) play a very large role in determining how much annual revenue any centre will get.  And yet the justification for the GAFs and GMs is clouded in mystery.  Geographic Adjustment Factors vary from 0.79 (Kingston, Lennox and Addington, Hastings, Renfrew) to 1.07 (City of Toronto).  In other words, for the same size of centre, a child care centre in Kingston will receive a Benchmark Allocation that is about 74% of the Benchmark Allocation in Toronto ((i.e., (0.79/1.07)*100).  Since wages and benefits are the lion’s share of child care costs, we have to ask whether compensation is that much lower in Kingston than in Toronto.  And if it is, should it be?


For new centres, a Growth Multiplier builds new revenue variation on top of the Benchmark Allocation.  Growth Multipliers are sometimes very small, for instance between 0.00 and 0.03 in City of Cornwall, Lennox and Addington, and Cochrane DSSAB, and sometimes much larger (for example, the multiplier is 0.30 in County of Lanark, United Counties of Prescott and Russell, County of Renfrew).   Lanark and Lennox and Addington are very close to each other.  It’s hard to believe that a centre in Lanark deserves a 30% supplement to its allocation in order to fund new growth, whereas a new centre established in Lennox and Addington has to get by with only a supplement of 2% to the regular Benchmark Allocation.  If you do a bit of math, you can figure that the amount of revenue available to a new centre in Toronto will be over 50% higher than to a new centre in Lennox and Addington.  That seems oddly disproportionate.

10. In the market economy, profit is a reward to the successful entrepreneur.  In other words, it is a reward to the entrepreneur who takes a risk, starts a business, and is successful in selling a product or service that people want to buy.  Not all entrepreneurs will make a profit, but the desire to earn a profit encourages entrepreneurs to spend time figuring out what people want and how to design and produce it for a price that consumers can afford.  That’s the theory, anyway.  And we put up with some producers earning big profits because we believe that profit encourages (some) entrepreneurs to try to satisfy consumer demand.

However, in this funding formula, profit has very little to do with desirable behaviours.  Every provider will earn a profit of something like 8% of revenues as an automatic result of the funding formula.  And that will be true for providers who work hard on improving quality and those who do not know much or care much about quality. 

11. I said above, under the list of positives, that the funding formula limits the amount of profit that can be earned (actually called the allocation “in lieu of profit/surplus”).  Formally, that’s true, but there appear to be other ways that unscrupulous for-profit operators could increase their takings.  For instance, operators that own their own facilities can lease them back to themselves as the centre owner. And, a centre owner can do management and supervisory work in her own centre and get paid for it.  The financial accountability measures in the funding plan are supposed to ensure that the amount of lease payments and the amount of owner’s compensation are reasonable, but that will be a difficult thing to do.

12. The allocation for wages and benefits of supervisory staff does not depend on the size of the centre.  However, large centres need more supervisory staff than small ones do.  A centre with 150 children will need both a supervisor and an assistant supervisor, at least. Therefore the new funding rules, that base the revenues for supervisor compensation only on the number of days of service operation rather than on the number of children, will encourage the licensing of many smaller centres which may not make sense.  It might actually be a more efficient use of resources to encourage larger centres, within reason.

13. The most general and perhaps most serious critique of the funding formula is that it does not effectively incentivize quality improvements by operators.  PEI’s funding formula encourages centres to hire staff with higher levels of qualifications – a centre’s funding gets multiplied when they hire better paid staff.  Quebec’s funding formula gives supplementary funding to centres that have higher costs because staff have greater amounts of experience or higher qualifications.  Ontario’s funding formula ensures that an extra dollar spent on quality or staff wages is a dollar taken away from something else.  As point 4 above notes, there is some encouragement to spend on quality for centres that have costs less than their Benchmark Allocation.  But, there is no encouragement to spend on quality for the 50% of centres that have costs higher than this.

BAD BITS

14. The revenue allocation for children of kindergarten age appears to be too low.  I’ve done calculations of the amount of revenue (including parent fees) that the formula allows for kindergarten-age child care.  If you have a centre with 78 kindergarten children, located in a school, the formula gives an average revenue per child per day, from all sources, of only $26.66.  This would need to cover wages and benefits of staff and supervisor and all operational costs. This figure then gets multiplied by the Geographic Adjustment Factor.  So in Toronto, multiplying by 1.07, the revenue for kindergarten-age children would average $28.53 per child.  In Kingston, multiplying by .79, the revenue for kindergarten-age children would average only $21.06 per child.  All other locations will be somewhere in between.

And this daily revenue allocation is the same for the (approximately) 191 days per year when a centre has to pay the costs of part-day care (before-and-after school care) and for the (approximately) 71 days when a centre has to pay the costs of full-day care required on professional development days, March and Winter Breaks, during summer school holidays, and for some statutory holidays.  But clearly, there are many more hours of staff time required for full-day care than for before-and-after school care.  How can it make sense to get the same revenue allocation for both?  Centres will have incentives to shut down any summer programming for sure.  Creating more service shortages.

15. The kindergarten problem with “hours” is also a problem across the system.  The funding formula does not take into account the daily number of hours of service a centre provides.  A preschool that operates only 2 ½ hours per day will get the same revenue allocation as a full-day centre open 11 hours per day.  If a centre cuts its hours to provide 9 hours a day instead of 11 or 12, the funding formula will still give it the same daily revenue.  The funding formula incentivizes cutting hours of care, for no obvious purpose.

This will be particularly problematic for any centre that seeks to provide non-standard-hours care, such as staying open in the evenings, or opening early in the mornings.  The extra hours of service will not deliver any additional revenue to the centre, so centres providing non-standard-hours care will be incentivized to close.

16. The funding formula is silent about what is happening with the child care subsidy system.  As we know, the subsidy system, reduces or eliminates parent fees for families with particularly low levels of income.   Apparently, the Ministry intends to provide sufficient funds to Service System Managers to at least keep the number of subsidized families at current levels, but it would be good to have assurances of this (or better) within the funding formula document itself.

17. The funding formula is similarly silent about the funding of services for children with special needs.  Funding and provision of services to children with special needs is an essential part of a publicly-managed child care system, but it is unclear how this will happen.

18. The funding formula is also silent about funding for professional development of staff.  Professional development is central to maintaining and enhancing quality of services, but is professional development now to be an optional activity for centres that have extra funding available, and not for others?

OVERALL EVALUATION

Designing a funding formula in a complicated province like Ontario is not easy.  And the near complete absence of cost data before the 2023 data collection process did not help.  The Ministry of Education has made a serious attempt to produce a cost-based funding formula that will permit Service System Managers to publicly manage child care centres and family child care agencies in their areas.  Service System Managers have many new roles – providing interpretation of new funding guidelines, judging the appropriateness and reasonableness of expenditures, managing processes of financial accountability, etc. – and will require additional resources to carry them out.

The speed of implementation of this funding formula is causing significant upset and chaos.  Technical documents that explain how benchmarks, adjustment factors and growth top-ups were calculated are not yet available, nor are standardized reporting forms.  Centres are having to plan next year’s budget without sufficient time to understand the new revenue rules.  This is unfortunate and increases the cacophony of criticism of the program, some of which could have been avoided.  However, the revenue-replacement model this replaces was even worse for centres, so we do not want to pause or reverse the transition to a new cost-based formula for centre revenues. In 2025 we will have to do the best we can to implement this new funding system.  There will be mistakes and inconsistencies this year.  There will be, and have been, different interpretations of what costs are eligible from different SSMs.  The Ministry will have to provide enhanced resources to help and to solve problems.

The funding formula would be much better if based on a compulsory wage grid – there would be much less variation in expenditure levels from centre to centre and compensation would be mostly removed as a form of competition between centres.

Revenue amounts for care of kindergarten-age children are too low and will incentivize dropping or reducing these programs.

Failure to take hours of service into account in determining revenue allocations is highly problematic and will incentivize shortening the daily hours of service provided. 

We need information about the funding of subsidies, special needs and professional development.

Many centres have run deficits in the last couple of years due to the shortfalls of the revenue-replacement model.  Is there going to be a special funding program through the SSMs to wipe out these debts, or are they somehow handled by Legacy Top-Up funding?  This is unclear.

The new funding formula is based on providing revenues for individual centres, not for groups of centres.  However, there are a significant number of multi-site providers in Ontario, particularly not-for-profits or municipal providers.  There is no provision in the new funding formula for multi-site planning and operation.  A multi-site agency cannot use surplus revenues in one centre to cover shortfalls or emergency repairs in another.  Going forward, the funding formula will need to be amended to encourage and facilitate multi-site operation rather than to discourage it.

Legacy Top-Ups will allow all current child care centre providers to fund all eligible costs at current levels, which is a way of avoiding immediate crises that would threaten the whole system.  This is a smart feature of the funding formula.  No existing centre will have to go out of business because the funding formula will not cover its current legitimate costs.

I haven’t yet looked at the funding formula as it applies to family child care agencies and family child care homes.  Reportedly, this is a mess, but I can’t know that yet for sure.

The biggest question going forward will be whether there is sufficient funding from this formula to support new spaces.  I have done some modelling that gives me approximate numbers.  What I have done is to look at centres that only have children from one age group and estimate the revenue per child that would be available through the Unadjusted Benchmark Allocation.  The Unadjusted Benchmark Allocation is the calculated revenue available to the centre before Geographic Adjustment Factors are included.  This Unadjusted Benchmark Allocation is different for a centre in a community compared to those centres that are school-based.

When I do these calculations, I find that for infants the total average daily revenue per child is between about $130 and $137 per day (lower for school-based than for community-based).  For toddlers, the total average daily revenue per child is between $87 and $95.  For children of preschool-age, the total average daily revenue is between $65 and $73.  For children of kindergarten-age, the daily revenue is between $26 and $39.  To know for your centre how much funding would be available, these numbers would have to be multiplied by the relevant Geographic Adjustment Factor and, for new spaces, by the relevant Growth Multiplier.  Is this enough funding to support growth of new spaces?  The jury is still out.  We need to compare these revenue figures to expected costs of good quality programs.

If the new funding formula does not support the operating costs of new centres, it is a failure, so this is a central issue.  I am happy to hear from you about whether the funding formula will support expansion in your community.  And, let us not forget that expansion also requires capital funding, which is in very short supply from this government.

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HALLELUJAH!  ONTARIO FINALLY HAS A NEW FUNDING FORMULA

Hallelujah!  As of August 14th, 2024, there finally is a funding formula to provide some revenue-certainty for child care providers in Ontario. Not a moment too soon, in fact, a year or two too late. As of January 2025, this formula for the provision of operational funding to providers will be implemented to replace the inequitable revenue-replacement model that has existed since April 2022. As the new funding guidelines admit “[w]hile a revenue replacement approach is transparent and simple to implement, it is not responsive to the true cost of providing child care in Ontario.” (p. 7).  Revenue replacement was not equitable and it did not facilitate growth of capacity, so we will not mourn its passing.

This marks a new stage of development of the $10 a day child care program in Ontario.  And, I am sure that other provinces will be looking closely at this example to see if they should model their funding formulas on this one.  Together, we need to assess whether the funding formula is any good and what its strengths and weaknesses are.  As with any funding formula, there are many details and understanding how the system will work is not easy.  This blog post is a start.  In this post, there is a lot of description and only a small amount of opinion.  More opinion will follow soon.

I think a question and answer format will be best.  And, I will, in this blog post, only describe funding for centres, not for home child care agencies.  I will get to family child care in a later post. 

  1. B2C2 and others have called for a funding formula similar to the one in Prince Edward Island; is Ontario’s new funding formula like PEI’s?

Ontario’s funding formula is not like PEI’s.  The allowed costs in PEI are based on the provincial wage grid for child care staff with wages varying by qualification level and experience.  PEI’s formula encourages hiring of staff with higher qualifications because operating funding is increased to cover actual wage costs.  Then, PEI has an allowance of 20% for benefits and there is a provincially-funded pension plan.  And PEI’s formula provides the same revenues across the Island for similar centres.

In contrast, Ontario does not have a wage grid for child care staff.  Ontario’s new funding formula gives flexibility to a centre to spend its allocation in different ways, but does not, in particular, reward the hiring of more staff who are fully qualified RECEs.  Ontario’s benchmark for benefits is only 13.4% for staff and 16.2% for Supervisors and there is no provincially-funded pension plan.  And operational funding for centres under the new funding formula in Ontario will be highly variable across different locations.

2. How is the Funding Formula structured?

The structure of the new Ontario child care funding formula is relatively simple, getting more complex as you get into the details.  The funding formula is based on calculation of what is called a “Benchmark Allocation”.  A Benchmark Allocation, as the Ministry of Education’s funding rules make clear, is supposed to represent “the typical costs of providing quality child care in a geographic region, based on planned operating spaces.”  (p. 9) . One of the Ministry’s goals with the new funding and accountability processes is “to gradually shift the overall cost of providing child care … towards more standardized costs, as represented by the benchmark allocations.” (p. 48).  On top of the Benchmark Allocation, there is also an allocation for profit or surplus.

Benchmark Allocations, which vary across the province, are designed so that about 50% of existing licensees will have their expected eligible costs fully covered.  The other 50% of licensees will not have their costs covered by the regular (benchmark) funding allocation, but legacy centres (those currently and continuously in CWELCC) with higher costs will be eligible for a Legacy Top-Up to this funding.  This top-up formula evaluates the 2023 cost structure of centres, along with 2025 evidence of some fixed costs such as rent, insurance and property tax. There is also a provision for cost increases since 2023.

Calculation of the Benchmark Allocation for a centre involves two parts:

  • Calculation of the Unadjusted Benchmark Allocation (total of four components)
  • This is multiplied by a Geographic Adjustment Factor (GAF) which can move the total up or down. 

Once adjusted in this way, our calculation is called the “Benchmark Allocation” for your centre. 

3. What About Top-Ups?

That’s not the end of it, though.  When the Ministry canvassed existing centres about their actual costs, they found lots of variation.  To account for this cost variation, the Ontario funding formula includes a Legacy Top-Up to provide additional revenue for legacy centres with costs higher than their Benchmark Allocation. 

In addition, there is another revenue top-up that applies only to new spaces or new centres.  This is called a Growth Top-Up and recognizes that the Benchmark Allocation will not necessarily be sufficient to cover operational funding of new capacity.  The Growth Top-Up will provide some increased operating revenues to most centres that are new or growing in capacity. 

Details on the Top-Ups

  • Legacy Top-Up – If you are a legacy centre (you were signed up to CWELCC when this funding formula was born and still are) and your proven costs (according to a formula) are higher than that Benchmark Allocation, your SSM will provide a Legacy Top-Up to cover these supplementary costs. 
  • Growth Top-Up – In the first year of any expansion, you will be eligible for a Growth Top-Up which recognizes the (higher than benchmark) program costs associated with new spaces that come on stream during the year.
  • In years after 2025, a centre that received either of these two top-ups will receive a “Rolling Top-Up” based on the calculated top-ups that were received in 2025.  In other words, these top-ups will become permanent in revenue calculations after 2025.

The “Program Cost Allocation” is the name the new funding system will use to describe the sum of your Benchmark Allocation plus any top-ups for which you are eligible

All of the above calculations are based on an annual operating plan for the coming year that each centre submits to its SSM.  Funding is determined based on the plans for each centre. 

Amongst other things, the operating plan will specify the planned number of operating service days for each age group and the planned number of operating spaces for each age group.  In order to calculate the amount of operating money the SSM will give you, the SSM must then subtract the amount of fee revenue (adjusted for enrollment shortfalls) you expect to receive from parents, or on behalf of parents who receive Child Care Subsidy.

It is important to note that funding is not aggregated across centres that have the same licence-holder, so that the funding allocation for a centre has to be spent on the costs of that specific centre.  This will, no doubt, cause problems for multi-site operations who are used to planning and funding activities across the group of centres, rather than treating each centre separately.

4. More details about Top-Ups

The funding guidelines describe Legacy Costs this way: “Legacy costs are costs that are consistent with legacy centres’/agencies’ 2023 cost structures, adjusted for eligibility, cost escalation, and changes to operating practices and fixed costs.”  Legacy Top-Ups are designed to ensure that Legacy Costs are covered going forward.  In applying for a legacy top-up, centres would provide an audited 2023 Statement of Operations and other financial information to their SSMs to calculate the cost of eligible services (e.g., for children 0-5 rather than 6-12) at the level of an individual licence.  From these costs, ongoing costs would be scaled up to reflect cost increases between 2023 and 2025.   This would allow the calculation of the amount by which Program Cost revenues need to be scaled up  to cover higher costs.  This is the Legacy Top-Up.  The Legacy Top-Up will take account of changes in spaces, days and hours of service over this period.

There is also a Growth Top-Up for all centres that are adding new spaces.  Before the calendar year begins, the annual revenues of each centre are determined by their SSM based on operational plans filed with the SSM.  For centres that expand licensed capacity during the year, an adjustment needs to be made.  This is the Growth Top-Up.  The calculation of revenues for these new spaces is largely similar to the calculation of the Benchmark Allocation, but applied only to the new spaces and with the allocation raised by a Growth Multiplier.  Importantly, there is no Legacy Top-Up on new spaces, even if other centres operated by the same licensee receive Legacy Top-Ups because of elevated costs.   The new Benchmark Allocation is multiplied by a Growth Multiplier.  This Growth Multiplier may add as little as 0% to the funding for these new space (City of Cornwall) or as much as 30% (County of Lanark, United Counties of Prescott and Russell, County of Renfrew, Rainy River DSSAB), based on geography. The typical value of the Growth Multipliers is about 15%.

Once these top-ups are added to the Benchmark Allocation for an eligible centre, the total is called the Program Cost Allocation.

5. What about Profit or Surplus?

The new Ontario funding formula has one more major component.  It builds in a separate allocation which goes as profit for owners or as surplus for non-profit or public child care centres.  Profit/surplus therefore does not depend on good performance, but is a guaranteed payment.  On the other hand, the formula provides a limitation on the amount of profit that can be earned in any year out of the government portion of revenues.

There are three parts to the calculation of profit/surplus (which the Ministry guidelines call “allocation in lieu of profit/surplus”).  There is a base amount, a part that is 3.5% times the amount of the Benchmark Allocation and a part that is 4.25% times the Program Cost Allocation (which is the sum of the Benchmark Allocation and the top-ups).  These three parts are added together to get the total Profit/Surplus allocation.  Both the Benchmark Allocation and the Program Cost Allocation are influenced by the Geographic Adjustment Factor.  That means that the amount of Profit/Surplus is also affected by this GAF.

6. How are the individual parts calculated that make up the Benchmark Allocation?

There are four components that are summed together to get the Unadjusted Benchmark Allocation: the Program Staffing Component (related to the wages and benefits of program staff), the Supervisor Component (related to the wages and benefits of the Supervisor), the Accommodation Component, and the Operations Component (related to all other costs, including wages and benefits of non-program staff).  These are calculated based on the number of licensed spaces for different age groups, the operating capacity this year for different age groups, the proportion of staff in your centre that are delivering CWELCC-eligible services, the number of service-days of child care you provide to each age group over the year and a few other things.  All of these calculations are based on your plans for your child care program in the coming year, not on past numbers.

In effect, each of the four components is adjusted according to a Geographic Adjustment Factor, although this calculation is  done at the end after the four components are summed together.  In other words, if you are in what the Ministry’s data says is a high cost area, the amounts for each element of this allocation will be boosted.  If you are in what the Ministry’s data says is a lower cost area, the amounts for each element of the allocation will be lowered. 

For example, centres in Toronto have a Geographic Adjustment Factor of 1.07; centres in Kingston have a Geographic Adjustment Factor of 0.79.  So, the benchmark revenue allocation in a Toronto centre will be boosted by 7%.  The benchmark revenue allocation in Kingston will be reduced by 21%.  These Geographic Adjustment Factors are said to represent differences in the costs of providing child care services in different parts of the province.

7. Can you provide a  simple example of how the Benchmark Allocation is calculated?

(There are some helpful worked-out examples from page 55 onwards in Schedule D of the Funding Guidelines.  But, the example below provides some additional words of explanation).

As an example, think of a child care centre in a community setting in Toronto that has 48 preschoolers and no other children, just to make calculations simple.  We will assume that the licensed capacity and actual operating capacity of the centre is 48 children.  The per-diem benchmark allowed in the funding formula for 2025 for preschoolers (full day child care for children over 2.5 years) is $39.23.  Assume the centre will be in operation 261 days per year.

To get the amount of the Program Staffing component, we multiply 48 preschoolers X 261 service-days per year X a per-diem of $39.23. X an ancillary costs multiplier (13.4% to cover mandatory benefits like CPP/EI/EHT/WSIB).  In the case of our example, that gives us an amount of $557,330.88. 

To get the Supervisor component of the Program Costs, we multiply 261 service-days per year X a Supervisor per-diem of $301.38 X a Supervisor ancillary costs multiplier (16.2% to cover mandatory benefits).  That gives us a total of $91,403.13.

The allowance for Accommodation costs is based on the number of licensed spaces, independent of current operating capacity.  In our example, there are 48 licensed spaces.  The annual per-space benchmark varies according to the age category of these licensed spaces, but also by whether the centre is in a community setting or is located in a public school.  For preschool spaces in a community setting, the benchmark is $1,735.54 per space.  For this centre, the Accommodation costs component would be 48 X $1,735.54 = $83,305.92.

The Operations Costs component has both a fixed and a variable part to the calculations, and varies according to whether the centre is in a community setting or a public school. The fixed part is based on the number of licensed spaces and the annual number of days of service and this varies by age category of children.  The variable part is based on the planned operating capacity and the number of days of service and this also varies by age category of children.  The community-setting benchmark for fixed operations costs for preschoolers is $15.09 per licensed space-day.  The community-setting benchmark for variable operations costs for preschoolers is $1.64 per operating space-day.  So, for our example, the fixed part of operations costs would be 48 X 261 X $15.09 = $189,047.52.  The variable part of operations costs would be 48 X 261 X $1.64 = $20,545.92.  The total allocation for operations costs would be $209,593.44.

If we sum the allocations for the four components in our example, we get $557,330.88 + $91,403.13 + $83,305.92 + $209,593.44 = $941,633.37.  This is the Unadjusted Benchmark Allocation.

This calculation would be the same for any centre with 48 preschoolers anywhere in the province.  However, the Geographic Adjustment Factor (GAF) will change this allocation in every location.  Toronto has a Geographic Adjustment Factor of 1.07 (i.e., relatively high typical costs) so multiply the Program Costs number by 1.07 to get $1,007,547.71.  With the GAF applied this is called the “Benchmark Allocation”.  To see the importance of this Geographic Adjustment Factor: if this same centre was in Kingston, the Benchmark Allocation would be $743,890.36.

It is important to note that this allocation can be spent in any way the centre thinks best to provide services for children.  It can pay lower or higher wages,  more or less in benefits, more or less to the Supervisor, more or less in mortgage or rental costs, more or less in the costs of operations, as long as these expenditures are judged to be eligible expenditures.  The flexibility in spending is potentially positive, but without a wage grid (there is only a wage floor for RECEs), it means that unscrupulous operators could cut corners on compensation and quality in order to spend money in other ways.  That would be undesirable, of course.

8. What about the calculation of profit/surplus for this centre?

The base amount of profit/surplus is $6,000 annually.  For our example centre of 48 preschoolers in Toronto, the part based on the Benchmark Allocation would be 0.035 X $1,007,547.71 = $35,264.17.  Because we are assuming no Legacy or Growth Top-Ups for this centre, the Program Cost Allocation is the same as the Benchmark Allocation.  Therefore, the part of profit/surplus based on the Program Cost Allocation is 0.0425 X $1,007,547.71= $42,820.78.  The sum of these three parts is the allocation in lieu of  Profit/Surplus, which is $84,084.95.

The total revenue of this centre during the year would be the Benchmark Allocation of $1,007,547.71 plus the Profit/Surplus allocation of $84,084.95, which equals $1,091,632.66.  Profit/Surplus would be 7.7% of total revenue.  Another way of thinking of it: profit in this example is a markup of 8.3% over the Benchmark Cost Allocation.

Not all of this revenue would come from the SSMs of course.  The planned amount to be received from parents or on behalf of parents (adjusted for enrollment) would be subtracted from this total revenue calculation to get the annual funds received from the SSM.

9. Does the new funding formula provide enough funding?

This, of course, is the big question.  I need you to help me answer this.  I have some examples in the table below and they give calculations of the total amount of revenue centres will have, based on their size and location in the province.  The examples are simple and do not include provision of before-and-after school care for kindergarten children.  There are three centre sizes:

  • 49 children: 10 infants, 15 toddlers, 24 preschoolers
  • 73 children: 10 infants, 15 toddlers, 48 preschoolers
  • 88 children: 10 infants, 30 toddlers, 48 preschoolers

These centres are located in Toronto, Ottawa and Windsor.  Toronto has a Geographic Adjustment Factor (GAF) of 1.07.  Ottawa has a GAF of 0.94.  Windsor has a GAF of 0.80. These Geographic Adjustment Factors play a big role in the revenue totals that centres will receive and these examples are a good indication of the range of revenue values that will affect centres across Ontario, urban and rural, north and south.   The other factor that affects funding is whether the centre is located in a community or in a publicly-funded school.  This affects funding allocations for Accommodation and for Operations.

This table calculates the total annual revenue of these centres. Total revenue includes both the amount to cover costs and the amount to cover profit or surplus.  Some of total revenue will come in funding from the SSM and some will come from parent revenue (or child care subsidy revenues provided on behalf of parents).  As parent fees go down, a greater percentage of revenues will come from government and a smaller percentage from parents, but the total revenue would remain the same (unless benchmarks are changed).


Table 1: Total Annual Revenues of Centres of Different Sizes and Locations

Under Ontario’s New Funding Formula – Community-Based and School-Based Centres

Toronto Ottawa Windsor
Community-based or School-based centreCommunityCommunityCommunity
Geographic Adjustment Factor - GAF1.070.940.8
Total Revenue – 49 space centre$1.394m$1.226m$1.044m
Total Revenue – 73 space centre $1.884m$1.656m$1.410m
Total Revenue – 88 space centre$2.283m$2.006m$1.709m
TorontoOttawa Windsor
Community-based or School-based centreSchoolSchoolSchool
Geographic Adjustment Factor - GAF1.070.940.8
Total Revenue – 49 space centre$1.291m$1.135m$0.967m
Total Revenue – 73 space centre $1.731m$1.522m$1.296m
Total Revenue – 88 space centre$2.098m$1.844m$1.570m

Notes:

  • Total Revenue figures in the table are in millions of dollars of revenue annually, including both operating funding from governments and parent fees.
  • 49 space centre has 10 infants, 15 toddlers, 24 preschoolers, all full-day
  • 73 space centre has 10 infants, 15 toddlers, 48 preschoolers, all full-day
  • 88 space centre has 10 infants, 30 toddlers, 48 preschoolers, all full-day

Notice that for the same sized centre, a location in Toronto will get revenues which are hundreds of thousands of dollars higher than a location in Windsor (or many other places across the province).  Are true underlying costs that different in different locations? 

And, are these amounts of total revenue enough to operate centres and provide good quality child care?  I don’t have enough evidence yet to draw a conclusion, but I’m happy to hear from centre directors about your example and experience.

These calculations are based on Ontario’s 2025 benchmarks.  Benchmarks can change in future years.  Current centres will be potentially eligible for Legacy Top-Ups.  And, allocations for new centres will be affected by Growth Multipliers (but not Legacy Top-Ups).

10. What is the role of the SSMs?

The SSMs have many roles in relation to planning and operationalizing growth plans and assisting and communicating with child care providers in a range of different ways.

If we focus specifically on their role in relation to funding in 2025, the SSMs have to:

  • Receive operational plans from each operator/each centre.  Operating plans will include planned operating spaces for each age group, planned number of service days for each age group, number of hours of service for each age group, copy of parent handbook. 
  • Collect legacy data from those operators claiming a Legacy Top-Up.  Legacy data in 2025 will include specific evidence of any fixed costs (especially accommodation costs), the operating budget for 2025, 2023 audited financial statements and any related financial reports to support claim.
  • Calculate the Program Cost Allocations for each centre including the Legacy Top-Ups, the Growth Top-Ups and the Profit/Surplus for each centre.
  • Schedule advance payments for each centre based on these calculated Allocations
  • Select centres that will have their reported costs reviewed in a cost review (not the same as the Direct Engagements on Compliance) and carry out cost reviews
  • Accept and process applications for in-year changes in funding
  • Collect spending attestations and standardized financial reports from each centre
  • Compare Allocations to Actual Costs/Spending and promptly recover overpayments to centres and refund these to Ministry.

11. What are the key issues with this new funding formula?

The biggest issue with the funding formula is one that is not yet answered.  In new centres and new spaces, will there be enough funding available for providers to fund the provision of good quality care with educators and other staff that are fairly and reasonably compensated?

The Legacy Top-Ups in the funding formula are designed to ensure that existing centres with costs that are higher than the median will not have to close their doors; their costs will apparently be compensated by revenue supplements that become permanent through Rolling Top-Ups.  That’s obviously a good thing, but Legacy Top-Ups are not available to new centres or even to new spaces in existing centres. 

So, in judging the adequacy of revenues provided by this funding formula going forward, we need to ignore Legacy Top-Ups.  They exist for Legacy centres (i.e., current centres), but not for new centres.  The real question is “for new spaces (growth), will the revenues be adequate to provide good child care?”.   At this point, we don’t have a clear answer.  What we do know is that new spaces will only be eligible for the Benchmark Allocation  plus the Growth Top-Up plus the Allocation in Lieu of Profit/Surplus. 

As for the rest of the key issues with this new funding formula, that’s a topic for another blog.  Coming soon.

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Affordable Child Care Services vs Money for Parents

Those who oppose the $10 a day program often argue that there is a simple and better program to replace it – give money directly to parents instead.  The logic is, at first glance, persuasive.  If you give parents money, it seems like they should be able to purchase exactly the child care they need.  And competition among different providers should, you might think, keep fees down.  Programs that directly fund child care services, like the $10 a day program, are said to be bureaucratic and inflexible and to create huge shortages and long waiting lists. 

There is some truth here, but much falsehood, and much deliberate ignoring of the evidence on the impact of a “family allowance” approach.  I have just written a report for The Prosperity Project that examines the likely impacts of giving parents money instead of funding and providing child care services that parents can use.  I unearth a lot of new data about families that are using child care in Canada and the number of parents who want access to affordable, accessible, high quality child care. 

The evidence shows that this type of “family allowance” fails as public policy because it:

(a) isn’t what most families want

(b) doesn’t address families’ needs for child care

(c) would be much more expensive than the $10 a day program

(d) would have negative effects on women’s employment and the economy, and would increase the gender-based child penalty that mothers pay with reduced earnings

(e) has been tried before and hasn’t solved child care issues, and

(f) ignores the very large child benefit programs that already provide money to parents.

You should read the report in full (19 pages), or at least its Executive Summary (3 pages).  Below, I provide a few tidbits to encourage you to dig deeper.

  • As of 2023, when Statistics Canada collected large amounts of data from parents about child care and employment, there are 938,000 Canadian children using licensed or accredited child care services – the kind of services supported by the federal government program.  In fact, over three-quarters of children using any kind of child care are in licensed care.   In 8 of Canada’s 13 jurisdictions, average fees for this child care is down to $10 a day or less.  Other jurisdictions have lowered fees by at least half relative to fee levels in 2019-20.  In other words, although the press scarcely covers it, a very large number of Canadian children and families are already benefiting from licensed child care that is subsidized to be affordable and more accessible.
    • Licensed child care is not the only part of the set of services and benefits that will make up a fully developed early learning and child care system.  Many children benefit from full-day or part-day kindergarten at ages 4 and 5 years.  Many children and families benefit from paid maternity and parental leave for up to 12 or even 18 months.  If we put these all together, it is already true that in 2023 over 1.5 million children currently benefit from Canada’s early learning and child care and leave arrangements.  That is about 2/3rds of all children 0-5 years of age.  
    • Some people think that the reason some parents don’t currently use child care is because they don’t want to.  But, outside Quebec, most families (58%) that currently do not use any child care would like to use some type of non-parental child care if they can find what they need and want.  And, of these, the lion’s share – 62% – would like to use licensed child care, largely as a means to join or rejoin the workforce. 
    • Some people argue that it is mostly affluent parents that benefit from universal child care programs and that marginalized families and those from diverse backgrounds are left behind.  That is certainly true of market-based child care systems when fees are not controlled; high parent fees are only affordable by affluent families and many vulnerable families do not qualify for income-based subsidies.  However in fixed-fee systems like the $10 a day program, families from all backgrounds gain access.  I show a series of charts from Quebec making this point.
    • A family allowance program would have to give parents an amount of money that was equivalent, on average, to what they gain by having $10 a day child care.  This family allowance program would cost the federal government just over $28.5 billion annually and its net cost would be three times as much as the cost of providing child care services.  
    • Women who have children suffer substantial losses in earnings after the birth of a child.  Economists have found that mothers’ earnings decrease by 49% in the year of a child’s birth.  Even ten years later, women suffer from an average earnings loss of 34% relative to their earnings before childbirth. Universal child care has been found to substantially reduce these “child penalties”.  In other words, accessible child care services make an important contribution to increasing gender equity.

    Please read the full report and executive summary. 

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    Who’s To Blame For Child Care Shortages In Ontario?

    Todd Smith is Ontario’s new Minister of Education and he has already decided who he wants to blame for Ontario’s child care shortages – it’s the federal government.  So, Todd Smith wants federal minister Jenna Sudds to release Ontario from the agreement it signed back in 2022 that limits expansion by for-profit enterprises to a maximum of 30% of the total expansion.  Ontario never wanted to limit for-profit expansion;  apparently they only signed the agreement under duress.

    The problem of child care shortages is a real one.  We need a lot more child care expansion in Ontario and we need it now.  We will need even more child care when Ontario drops the parent fee down to $10 a day.

    But Todd Smith doesn’t seem to understand why Ontario is facing such a shortage of child care spaces, so he’s coming up with solutions that are antithetical to the high quality universal child care we have been promised.  He’s new in his job, so let’s give him a primer:

    • Ontario knew very well that there would be a huge shortage of child care spaces.  The Financial Accountability Office of Ontario told them this in November 2022;
    • The solutions are well known. Ontario’s officials and politicians were told by many people – including me and the Financial Accountability Office – what steps they needed to take to make child care expansion happen;
    • Instead of implementing these solutions, Ontario has fumbled and delayed and prevaricated and done nothing, or very little, to facilitate the child care expansion that is needed;
    • Now, Ontario wants to blame the federal government for Ontario’s failures to provide new child care facilities for parents and children that need it.  Some blame is due to the federal government, but Ontario is the one with the responsibility and capacity to fix the shortages;
    • It is true that for-profit child care providers are quicker to assemble capital funding than non-profits, but there are serious long-term costs.  Ontario knows well how to facilitate non-profit and public child care expansion; its current child care system has been built primarily this way. 
    • Quebec’s experience makes it clear that  relying on for-profit child care can come at a substantial cost in child care quality, which Todd Smith is ignoring.

    Ontario knew there would be a substantial shortage of spaces

    In November 2022, the Financial Accountability Office of Ontario (FAO) reported to the Legislative Assembly that at $10 a day, Ontario parents would need 300,000 additional child care spaces.  Demand would increase by that much.  They compared that to the 71,000 additional spaces that Ontario was planning to add between 2022 and 2026.  The FAO’s conclusion was that when parent fees reach $10 a day “…the families of 227,146 children under age six (25 per cent of the projected under age six population of 919,866 children in 2026) would be left wanting but unable to access $10-a-day child care.”

    I had published similar estimates in May 2021.

    Ontario has promised an additional 86,000 new child-care spaces compared to 2019.  As Allison Jones article for Canadian Press tells us, so far there have been about 51,000 new spaces created in Ontario, with only half inside the $10-a-day system.

    Ontario knew what to do to expand child care

    The FAO, in its understated way, had already identified one key barrier to expansion that Ontario should deal with.  Its November 2022 report stated that “…uncertainties over some aspects of the $10-a-day child care program, such as the extent of ministry reimbursement of future cost increases to child care providers, could reduce incentives for child care providers to create spaces.”   In other words, if child care providers do not know whether revenues will be enough to cover their legitimate costs, they won’t decide to expand. 

    Working with Building Blocks for Child Care (B2C2), I wrote and circulated widely a paper and a blog post laying out the steps needed to facilitate the expansion of non-profit and public child care:

    1. A system of capital grants and loan guarantees for not-for-profit and public operators
    2. Creating public planning mechanisms with provincial, municipal, school board and community members
    3. An inventory of publicly-owned lands and buildings suitable for child care expansion
    4. Mandate where possible the co-location of licensed child care services whenever business and housing developments happen
    5. Explore the use of Land Trusts to preserve the preservation of child care assets in public hands for future generations
    6. Use provincial legislation and regulations to control transfers of child care assets and ensure they are not controlled by big-box corporate child care chains
    7. Early guarantees of operational funding and licensing of not-for-profit and public operators that plan expansion following public plans.
    8. Development and implementation of a province-wide salary and benefits grid and much more funding to increase compensation of educators and other staff. Recruitment and retention of qualified educators is Job #1.
    9. Transparent and effective future funding guidelines to support expansion. Assistance to municipalities to implement financial accountability measures in a long-term funding model.
    10. Public funding of organizations such as B2C2 that support not-for-profit operators to negotiate hurdles associated with expansion of child care services

    Ontario has done very little to facilitate expansion

    Ontario thought that child care expansion would be a natural process, not requiring much government support.  Based on what Ministry of Education officials told the FAO “The ministry plans to create 71,000 net new spaces through what it terms natural growth (48,459 spaces) and induced demand (22,406 spaces)”  (FAO Report, 2022). Except the “natural growth” has not happened.  Here’s why.

    In Ontario:

    • Operators do not know what their future revenues will be or what factors will generate more or less revenue.  Their future revenues will be governed by the new funding system which Ontario promised in 2023 and again in 2024 and now will come in 2025.    Ontario still has the funding arrangement it invented on-the-fly on day one of the new child care system.  Which was to just replace the exact amount of the fee that child care centres charged on March 27, 2022.  But as anyone who has lived through the last few years would tell you, the costs of everything have been changing a lot in the last while.  And since, in the child care sector, there are substantial shortages, costs of some things have been rising substantially. 
    • There is very little funding support for expansion of child care centres.  There is start-up funding to pay for toys and equipment, but no capital grant program for community child care.  There has been capital money for new centres on school board premises, first announced in 2019 (i.e., expansion planned before the $10 a day program), but now even expansion in 56 of these school board centres has been cancelled by the Ontario government. 
    • In the midst of a huge shortage of early childhood educators – estimated by the Ministry of Education as a shortage of 8,500 new educators by 2026  – the support by the Ontario Government for staff wages is stingy at best.  In Ontario the base wage rate for an early childhood educator is $23.86 per hour, while the average hourly wage of all Ontario employees is $36.14 per hour.  In PEI, the base wage rate for an early childhood educator is $28.36 per hour, and the average hourly wage of all PEI employees is the same – $28.36 per hour.  There are huge child care staff shortages in Ontario, but not in PEI.

    We know that Ontario is able to expand capacity quickly if it were to be a priority.  In 2010-2014, Ontario provided expanded classroom space for about 280,000 children who moved from half-day kindergarten to full-day kindergarten.  All of that expansion in only 5 years.  Because it was a priority.  The financial and personnel resources were mobilized to make it happen.  But, the expansion of child care for the tens of thousands of Ontario children who want access is clearly not a priority for this government.

    Having committed itself to building an affordable, accessible child care system largely with federal money, the Ontario government decided to sit on its hands and let the system fall apart.  They did the easy part.  They lowered parent fees, initially by 25% and then approximately by another 25%, so that parent fees are much lower than they were.  So, demand for child care has skyrocketed.

    But the Ontario government has not done the hard parts – reducing workforce shortages by raising compensation, providing substantial capital and management supports for child care expansion, and implementing a funding system to provide guaranteed operating revenues for providers.

    So, now there are shortages.  And the Ford government has been sitting on its hands, waiting for the crisis to get worse. 

    Ontario wants to blame the federal government

    This was a sweet deal for Ontario, because the federal government committed to turning over a huge whack of money to Ontario to make this happen. In the first  year (which was virtually over by the time Ontario had signed the agreement), the federal government provided $1.1 billion for Ontario child care.   In every year after that the federal contribution to child care in Ontario has risen and will reach just less than $3 billion in 2025-26.  By this time, the federal government will be paying about $3 for every $2 spent by Ontario to support providing child care for Ontario’s children and families.

    There are elements of blame that the federal government should wear.  The reforms should have been phased in more slowly, so that demand did not ramp up so fast.  And, the federal government will need to provide more money – there is not enough to support child care for an additional 300,000 children that the FAO predicts will want child care.

    But the federal government has now put over $1 billion on the table in reduced-interest loans and another $625 million distributed to provinces for capital grants to support child care expansion. Ontario will get the largest share of those amounts.

    If Ontario does not do the hard work of…

    • reducing workforce shortages,
    • providing supports for child care expansion by nonprofits and public agencies, and
    • providing operating revenues with an equitable and sufficient funding system,
      then sufficient child care expansion will not happen in either the for-profit or the non-profit and public sectors.

    For-profit expansion is easier but more dangerous

    When it comes to growth, for-profit child care providers have structural advantages over not-for-profits.  Not-for-profits are frequently unwilling to go into debt, so there needs to be a program of capital grants and encouragement to access low-interest loans to pay for the costs of building new facilities or repurposing existing buildings.

    The mission of for-profit businesses is to make a profit, so expansion is a natural fit, particularly when the government is paying  80%-90%  of the operating costs and providing a guaranteed demand for services.  Shareholders or banks are always willing to ante up when the government is willing to provide guaranteed funding for profit-making businesses.  They are not used to providing similar supports for non-profits in the child care sector.

    But there are ways around these structural barriers faced by not-for-profits.  Not-for-profits need two main things if they are to build new capacity quickly.  First, is access to capital.  Some of this should come in the form of capital grants to not-for-profits or municipalities or school boards who are willing to move quickly.  Some of this can be in the form of low-interest loans, like those that will soon be available from CMHC.  Governments should guarantee the loans, but most importantly, the Ontario government needs to ensure that there will be ample operating funding for child care centres to pay back the loans over time.

    The second thing that not-for-profits need is a development champion – a development agency that specializes in handling all the details involved in building new capacity or renovating existing capacity.  This is familiar territory for co-operative housing or not-for-profit housing developments.  There are specialized agencies that handle the housing development and then turn the housing over to co-ops or not-for-profit housing agencies to manage and operate.  This should be the case for child care as well.

    Neither of these barriers is particularly insurmountable, but they do require governments to facilitate surmounting them.  In many cases, public agencies such as municipalities, school boards, and community colleges can help a great deal in supporting not-for-profit and public developments.  And the provincial and federal governments should be open to expansions of kindergarten integrated with before-and-after school care. 

    Ontario shows that rapid expansion of not-for-profit child care services is very possible.  Over the 10 years up until 2019-2020, centre spaces increased in Ontario by 198,600.  Fully 85% of the increase (168,900 spaces) was in not-for-profit child care. 

    Quebec shows us the terrible cost of expanding mostly in the for-profit sector

    Todd Smith should talk to Mathieu Lacombe, Minister of Families in Quebec from October 2018 to October 2022 in the conservative government of François Legault.  Andrew-Gee in the Globe and Mail quotes Mathieu Lacombe: “Allowing for the expansion of private daycare, he said, was the ‘biggest mistake the Quebec government committed in the last 25 years.’”  

    Of course, Todd Smith could also decide to read the Auditor-General’s report for 2023-24 in Quebec.  This report looked at measured quality levels in child care centres serving children 3-5 years of age.  It also looked at what percent of front-line child care staff are qualified early childhood educators.  The Auditor-General investigated the performance of three types of child care centres – the nonprofit CPEs, the for-profit child care centres that charge a fixed fee, and the for-profit child care centres that are funded by a parental tax credit for child care expenses (and do not have fixed fees).

    For-profit operators are always looking for a way to save money and increase profits.  In child care, saving money generally means cutting back on staffing, because staffing takes up the large majority of the costs of providing care for your children.  Before the pandemic, the required ratio in Quebec was that 2/3rds of front-line staff would be qualified staff – early childhood educators with a diploma.  This ratio was lowered to 1/3rd of staff during the pandemic as an emergency measure but raised to ½ in March 2023.  It  was supposed to return to 2/3rds by March 2024, but the Quebec government had to delay this due to widespread shortages of early childhood educators.

    The table below gives the full story for 2023 in Quebec.  It tells us what percent of the three types of child care centres were below three benchmark levels of child care staffing.  The first benchmark is one-third of staff who are qualified as early childhood educators.  The second benchmark is one-half and the third benchmark is two-thirds of staff qualified as early childhood educators.

    As you can see, the nonprofit centres score much better on the percent of early childhood educators than either of the for-profit categories.  Shockingly, 19% of the for-profit tax-credit-funded centres do not even have one out of every three staff qualified as an early childhood educator.  Over half of these centres do not meet the currently required ratio of one-half of staff being early childhood educators.  And 86% of these for-profits do not meet the 2/3rds requirement that Quebec has been trying to re-establish. 

    Percent of Front Line Staff Who are  Qualified Early Childhood Educators in Non-Profit, For-Profit Fixed Fee, and For-Profit Variable Fee Centres in Quebec, 2023

    % of nonprofit centres% of for-profit fixed-fee centres% of for-profit tax-credit-funded centres% of all centres
    Less than 1/3rd of staff qualified as educators1%3%19%7%
    Less than 1/2 of staff qualified as educators5%19%55%23%
    Less than 2/3rds of staff qualified as educators18%53%86%46%


    Staffing has a big effect on quality, of course.  Quebec has had a program of testing quality in 3-5 year-old classrooms in Quebec centres since 2019.  The Auditor-General summarized the results.  Over the period 2019 to 2023,  36% of “garderies subventionées” – for-profit child care centres that charge a fixed fee – failed the quality examination. In other words, they showed quality levels that had some important problems and were unacceptably low.   Worse than that were the “garderies non-subventionées” – the tax-credit-funded child care centres that are able to set their own fee levels and wages.  47% of these – very nearly half of all centres tested – failed the quality examination over the period 2019-2023.  In line with their greater reliance on qualified early childhood educators, only 11% of CPEs – the nonprofit child care centres that are the heart of the fixed fee system – failed the quality test.

    There is no such thing as a free lunch.  Todd Smith should learn that lesson.  In the short run, you might save money by relying on for-profit child care expansion, because they will find their own capital money, especially corporate child care with deep pockets and those supported by private equity capital.   Pretty soon, however, you will have built a child care system that is offering poor quality services to your province’s children and their parents.  And you know that you will end up paying for the for-profit’s capital expansion in the long run, so you might as well do the work now to encourage non-profit and public child care to take up its 70% share.

    What we have in Quebec is a demonstration of the pernicious effects of unleashing the profit motive in child care – which is what Quebec did especially from about 2009 onwards.  I am not trying to say that all for-profit operators provide poor quality child care or that all of them skimp on child care staffing.  Some small for-profit operators provide good quality care and devote themselves to quality improvements.  You can have a certain percentage of for-profit providers in a publicly-funded child care system, but there need to be strong measures of public management that limit the ability of for-profit enterprises to extract profit at the expense of quality.  The measures of public management are obviously insufficient in parts of Quebec’s child care system.  And Todd Smith cannot be trusted to ensure strong public management in Ontario.   

    Who’s to blame for child care shortages in Ontario?  Look in the mirror, Mr Smith.

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    The Fraser Institute’s Evaluation of the $10 a Day Child Care Reforms

    This is not his best work.  Phillip Cross has had a notable career at Statistics Canada.  He’s an expert in macroeconomic trends.  But, one thing that he knows very little about is child care.    Unfortunately, he has written a short paper for the Fraser Institute evaluating the success or failure of the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care reforms so far. 

    It’s bad. Almost everything in the paper is either wrong or misleading.

    So what does Phillip Cross say?

    • He says that the Canada-Wide early learning and child care program had 3 goals:

    (1) providing more jobs in the child care industry,

    (2) enabling mothers to join the labour force, and

    (3) providing better care for young children. 

    His paper will look at the first two.

    • He looks at some evidence and concludes that there has been no change in the employment trends in child care staff.
    • Then, he looks at evidence about women’s labour force participation and concludes that it has hardly changed since 2015.
    • Having concluded that the Canada-Wide child care reforms are a failure, he goes on to take pot shots at Quebec’s child care system concluding that its universal child care system doesn’t really help low-income families, wasn’t really responsible for the boost in its labour force participation, has long waiting lists due to inadequate supply, and isn’t really universal.

    Phillip Cross is wrong on all counts, contributing yet more false information to child care discussions in Canada.  There are many problems with the rollout of the Canada-Wide program across the provinces and territories – particularly slow rates of growth in child care capacity.  However, the Fraser Institute paper does not grapple with real issues and propose real solutions.

    Phillip Cross, believe it or not, ignores improving the affordability of licensed child care in his list of goals of the Canada-Wide program.  This, of course, is the greatest success of the program so far.  Hundreds of thousands of children and families have benefited from less expensive child care.  Their very high child care costs have been cut by half or more.  These parents are very happy with the marvellous success of the program.


    Employment in the Child Care Industry

    There has been substantial growth in employment in the day care industry (NAICS Code 6244) since April 2021 when the Canada-Wide program was announced.  By my reckoning, the number of persons employed in Canada outside Quebec has risen by 36.9%, a total of 32,885 additional persons employed.  Phillip Cross hides this growth in two ways.  First, he looks at Canada including Quebec, which is inappropriate.  Quebec has a mature child care system and its employment of child care staff is not growing quickly.  The focus of growth in the Canada-Wide program is on the provinces and territories outside Quebec.

    Second, Phillip Cross ignores the collapse of child care employment during the pandemic and assumes that child care employment should have grown as if the pandemic did not happen.  In fact, child care employment in Canada outside Quebec collapsed from over 100,000 at the beginning of 2020 to less than half of that a few months later.  Employment did not climb above 100,000 until March of 2022.  So, the Canada-Wide program has helped the revival of employment in the child care industry and gone well beyond.  We should celebrate this, rather than hiding it.  This evidence can be found in Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 14100201.


    Mothers in the Labour Force

    Phillip Cross concludes that the Canada-Wide program has also shown no progress in supporting mothers to enter the labour market.  According to him, labour force participation hit its peak in 2015 and even after all this money spent on child care, it has only just about reached the same level.  As he notes, the participation rate was 61.7% in 2015 and now it is just 61.5%.

    But, Cross is not looking at the right statistics.  He is looking at the labour force participation of all women 25-54 years of age.  However, most women do not currently have a child 0-5 years of age.  Women without young children would not have their labour force participation affected by the Canada-Wide child care program.

    The Fraser Institute report should instead be looking at labour force participation of mothers with children 0-5 who are the target of the program.  Here, participation rates are up by several percentage points from April 2021 to now (from 76.9% to 79.9%) even though expansion of child care has been slower than it should be.  And compared to 2015, which the Fraser Institute cites as the high water mark, the labour force participation of mothers with children 0-5 is over 6 percentage points higher now than it was then.  So this evidence of “failure” is false news and should not be left to become conventional wisdom.  This data can be found in Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 14100397.


    Quebec’s Universal Child Care System

    Phillip Cross would presumably be very surprised to hear that Quebec’s child care system is very popular with parents and with the Quebec government.  He believes that low-income families have been squeezed out of access to child care.  In fact, there is good evidence that a much higher percentage of low-income families in Quebec have been able to access child care than was true for low-income families in the rest of Canada in the period before the Canada-wide system[1]. The universal system of child care in Quebec encouraged many more low income mothers into the labour force and into using child care.  It is true, and a problem, that on average low-income families are more likely to have their children in the lower-quality for-profit child care services.  The Quebec government is expanding not-for-profit centres as a partial remedy.

    Cross claims that Quebec’s child care system is not universal.  His evidence for this seems to be that there are 51,000 families on a waiting list for child care services.  Here his lack of child care knowledge is really showing.  This is a waiting list to get into one part of their child care system – the preferred part with a fixed fee and many better quality services. 

    There is no overall shortage of child care spaces in Quebec; in fact there are many empty spaces in the for-profit child care services funded by a tax credit.  But parents don’t prefer these for-profit spaces where there is no guaranteed parent fee.  These services have been shown to be much poorer quality than the not-for-profit spaces in CPEs (early childhood centres).  So, yes, there are 51,000 children on a waiting list to get out of these tax-credit-funded spaces and into the fixed-fee services that they prefer.

    Finally, Phillip Cross tries to deny that the universal child care system in Quebec has been responsible for dramatic increases in labour force participation of mothers.  He writes that “proponents attribute the increase in female participation in Quebec to its childcare program” and “Clearly, some determinants of female labour force participation are not understood by researchers, who nevertheless loudly endorse Quebec’s initiative.”  This is a bit strange, because if there is one thing that all economic studies of the Quebec child care program are agreed upon, it is that there was a substantial boost to mothers’ labour force participation and hours of work as a result of universal child care.

    A summary of the results of one of the many studies goes like this:  “Lefebvre and Merrigan[2] (2008) use Statistics Canada’s Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) annual data from 1993 to 2002. Using the sample of all Canadian mothers with at least one child aged 1 to 5, they find that the policy had substantial effects on a diversity of labour supply indicators (participation, labour earnings, annual weeks and hours worked). In 2002, the effects on participation, earnings, annual hours and weeks worked of the childcare policy are respectively between 8.1 and 12 percentage points, $5,000 to $6,000 (2001 dollars), 231 to 270 annual hours at work, and 5 to 6 annual weeks of work.“   

    The Fraser Institute is not noted for the complete accuracy of its studies, but this is a bit ridiculous.  As an evaluation of the success or failure of the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care program, the Fraser Institute study is worse than useless. It is, perhaps deliberately, misleading. 

    Instead, we should conclude that:

    • Hundreds of thousands of children and families have benefited from more affordable licensed child care
    • There are now nearly 33,000 more persons working in the day care industry than there were when the program was announced in April 2021 – an increase of nearly 37%.  Many more qualified educators are needed, but this is a good start.
    • Even though the growth in the number of child care spaces has been too slow, there has still been a rise of 3 percentage points in the labour force participation rate of mothers with children 0-5 since April 2021.  Again, only a start, but definitely a start.
    • Quebec does have a universal child care program and many families access child care for less than $10 a day.  It is a very popular program with families.  There is no overall shortage of child care spaces in Quebec, but many families want to get into the fixed-fee part of the child care system, especially the better-quality not-for-profit CPEs.  Many of these families are on a waiting list.  A large number of low-income families have benefited from the universal child care program in Quebec, a much larger percentage than benefited from Canada’s targeted child care assistance.  There is still important work to do to ensure that low-income families also benefit equally from better quality in child care services.

    [1] Cleveland, G. (2017) “What is the Role of Early Childhood Education and Care in an Equality Agenda?” pp. 75-98 in Robert J. Brym ed. Income Inequality and the Future of Canadian Society ISBN-13:978-1-77244-044-7 Oakville, ON: Rock’s Mills Press. Proceedings of the inaugural S.D.Clark memorial symposium.  That study found that:” In Quebec, 61.8 percent of children 1-5 years with an employed or studying mother with a high school education or less use licensed child care. Including children with a mother who is not employed, 43.1 percent of Quebec children whose mother has a high school education or less are using licensed child care — about 30 percentage points higher than the comparable figure in the rest of Canada.“

    [2] Lefebvre, P., Merrigan, P. (2008). Childcare policy and the labor supply of mothers with young children: a natural experiment from Canada. Journal of Labor Economics 23, 519–548.

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    Some Thoughts About Australian Child Care Policy

    The Labor federal (i.e., Commonwealth) government of Australia has declared its intention to move towards universal child care. There is a lot of interest in the Quebec model. The Commonwealth government asked the Productivity Commission to investigate and to provide a roadmap towards universal early childhood education and care throughout Australia.

    The post below is my submission in response to the draft report of the Productivity Commission which you can find here. As you can see, my advice and comments are strongly informed by Canada and Quebec’s experiences.

    Response to the Productivity Commission Draft Report

    Main Messages

    • The final report of the Productivity Commission should lay out a 10-20 year vision of recommended steps to achieve universal affordable, accessible, high quality child care.  The recommendations in the draft report go only\ part way to universal child care.  The recommendations should include ways in which there can be guaranteed fee levels for parents, much greater financial accountability of operators, and substantial introduction of supply-side operational  funding. 
    • There should be a much stronger gender equity lens by which recommendations are judged and through which recommendations are presented.  This would affect recommendations that imply that 3 days a week is the norm for child care attendance and mothers’ participation in the labour force.
    • The commercialization of child care provision should be an issue of concern.  Child care growth has been very unbalanced; nearly all new centre-based child care for at least 10 years, and probably 20 years, has been commercial.  There are not adequate supports needed for expansion of not-for-profit services.
    • In the draft report, the description and lessons learned from the experience of child care reforms in Quebec is one-sided.

    There are some good things about the lengthy and detailed Productivity Commission Draft Report. 

    If there is not enough money to do everything right away, it is often sensible to prioritize providing child care services to children in lower-income families.  Moving to 100% subsidy and getting rid of the activity requirement for 3 days a week of child care services will address some important barriers to participation by children in lower-income families while directing over half of the additional assistance to families in the lowest 20% of the income distribution.  Even here, there are potential issues with the proposals[1].

    Getting rid of the activity requirement for 3 days a week will also help some middle-income families where parents have irregular work activity and will tend to normalize regular child care attendance for children.

    And the Productivity Commission dips its toe in the water of supply-side funding in remote communities where the profit motive clearly does not adequately encourage needed supply.  This is an important start, even if a minor one.

    However, as a guide to the pathway to universal child care in Australia,  the Productivity Commission’s draft report is disappointing.

    1. The government asked for a plan to move towards universally accessible, affordable and high-quality child care.  This draft report does not deliver this.  Instead it chooses to primarily fill one hole in the current state of accessibility – access by lower-income families.  Unless the Productivity Commission believes that all other families already had affordable access to child care (which is unlikely since the average out-of-pocket amount that parents pay for centre-based child care is $44.42 a day per child), remedying this one (important) problem will certainly not deliver universal child care. As long as there is no legislative or regulatory limitation on parent fees and no limitation on centres charging full fees for unused hours above 50 in a week, child care in Australia will be unaffordable and inaccessible for some families, perhaps many families, who have middle and higher incomes, as well as families with lower incomes.   As long as there are either financial or supply barriers that prevent access, early childhood education and care is not universal.  Frankly, despite the Productivity Commission’s mandate to study how universal child care can be achieved, there is evidence in the draft report of some bias against universal child care, reflected in the cautious nature of the recommendations and in the one-sided evaluation of Quebec’s system of universal early childhood services.

    2. The Productivity Commission’s draft report appears to reflect a view that child care markets work well in Australia, and that strong competitive pressures already compel commercial operators of early childhood services to keep costs low, expand to serve new needs and continually enhance quality.  In other words, the Productivity Commission believes that current funding and regulatory arrangements provide the appropriate incentives and controls to make child care providers serve the public interest.  Apparently, only a few tweaks are necessary to make these services more accessible.

    This optimistic view is less true than the Productivity Commission believes; the problems are larger and the need for reform is greater.  First, we know that competition in child care markets is very localised, largely because few parents want to regularly transport their children more than a couple of kilometres to a child care service.  So, each centre only really competes – on price, services and quality – with other centres close by.  Generally, that means that competitive pressures are not that strong. 

    Fees have not been kept down by competition; they have been continually rising for many years. The current average daily fee for centre-based child care is $133.96 per child. Over 20% of child care centres charge more than the hourly rate cap (currently $13.73 per hour for centre-based day care for children younger than school age), particularly for-profit centres.  There is little evidence that costs and fees are controlled by strong competitive pressures.

    One of the hallmarks of competitive markets is that prices charged are forced down close to actual costs. If the price of one product or service is much higher than its per-unit costs, we would expect profit-seeking producers in a competitive market to offer this product or service at a lower price and take a large number of customers away from existing providers. In centre-based child care, given the required staff-child ratios, the labour costs for infant care must be close to 3 times the labour costs of child care for three- and four-year-old children.  And labour costs are the large majority of total costs.  Yet, competition does not drive centres to charge much lower fees for older children than they do for infants. There is a large variation in per-child costs and there is virtually no difference in fees.  And there are long waiting lists for child care for children less than two years of age, mostly because infant care is less profitable. These facts are a strong signal suggesting that child care markets in Australia are only weakly competitive. 

    Figure 4 of the interim ACCC report suggests that average occupancy rates of large providers of centre-based day care are about 75%.  We know that occupancy rates are a key driver of per-unit costs.  In a competitive market, we would expect strong pressures on operators to cut fees in order to increase occupancy, lower per-child costs and maintain quality.  This does not appear to be widespread in child care markets.

    In short, the main mechanism that makes the Productivity Commission so complacent – competitive pressure – cannot realistically be assumed to deliver publicly beneficial results on its own.  There is a need for more public management – active market stewardship – and financial accountability.

    3. There is no realistic plan to keep child care fees from rising faster than the CPI (which they have been doing for many years)[2].  Draft recommendation 6.2 suggests a new hourly rate cap for Child Care Subsidy based on the “average efficient costs of providing early childhood education and care services”.   Unfortunately, there is no unique average efficient cost.  As mentioned above, just think of infant care with required child-staff ratios of 4 to 1 vs. care for children over 36 months of age with required child-staff ratios of 11 to 1 in many states and territories.  How could there possibly be a unique average efficient cost per unit across these different age groups?  And look at cost variations that are recognized in supply-side-funded jurisdictions.  In Quebec and New Zealand[3], for instance, child care operating payments vary across a number of important factors that drive key cost variations – staff experience levels and qualifications and pay rates, legitimate variations in arms-length occupancy costs, higher per-unit costs in thinner markets, etc.  Unless the Productivity Commission can propose a realistic set of rate caps tailored to different circumstances and a means of regularly updating them and enforcing them, this recommendation may not work.

    4. The recommendations in the report would establish 3 days a week as a norm for the number of days a mother should work.  This is negative for gender equity, which is already dramatically impacted by the almost universal assumption that women are primarily or solely responsible for the day-time care of children before school.  The draft Productivity Commission report shows that the average size of the motherhood penalty in Australia – the amount of previous earnings that is lost when mothers bear children – is 55% (!), higher than in many other countries.  The motherhood penalty is explained by lower rates of employment, lower hours per week of employment, and lower hourly pay of mothers. The Productivity Commission is doing a good thing by reducing the impact of the activity test on access to child care.  That will lower barriers to employment for mothers. However, they should recommend its elimination entirely for 5 days a week.  To me, the recommendation as it stands suggests that children only need child care for 3 days a week, and that child care for more than 3 days a week may be negative for children and is done only for the mothers who insist on working too long weekly hours (to whom the activity test is applied).   There is increasingly strong evidence[4] that universal child care in Quebec and elsewhere has reduced motherhood penalties substantially.

    5. The Productivity Commission appears to believe that the widespread use of only three days a week of child care is due to maternal preference rather than to the unaffordability of 5 day a week child care.  They show self-reported numbers that allegedly prove that very few mothers would work longer hours each week (and use 5 days of child care) under any circumstances.  In other words, the motherhood penalty in Australia is the result of mothers’ deliberate and free choices.  I doubt it.  In contrast, the ACCC believes that “the price of childcare significantly impacts how much childcare households use.” (p. 22).

     It is true that lower labour force participation and part-time work for mothers are strong norms in Australia, compared to many other countries.  However, there are reasons to believe that if child care was universally affordable and accessible in Australia, those norms would change.  As evidence, look at the very substantial changes in labour force participation of mothers with children 0-4 in Australia over the 12 years from 2009-2021.  In 2009, 48% of mothers with young children stayed outside the labour force.  By 2021, that number had fallen by one-third (16 percentage points!) to 32%.   That would seem to indicate that mothers’ employment decisions may be quite sensitive to changes in policy, rather than fixed by historical norms.  This matters for the motherhood penalty, but it also matters a lot for the funding of child care programs; in Quebec, a large portion of the fiscal costs of child care programs is funded by increased incomes and taxes due to changed employment.

    6. There is no plan for requiring financial accountability of providers for the vast sums of government money they receive.  The legal fiction is that parents who receive subsidies for the purchase of child care are effective watchdogs of how the money is spent.  This is so obviously not true that it needs little argument to reject it.  But, there is no requirement for providers to show that they have spent money wisely to achieve publicly desirable purposes.  There are some serious red flags that the Productivity Commission does not really address.  They report that there are many hours of ECEC services that are paid for each day (by parents and the government) but are not used. This sounds like evidence of substantial inefficiency in current funding and attendance arrangements.  The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) report concludes that for-profit child care providers pay more for occupancy costs than not-for-profit providers (and that part of this may be due to the use of facilities for which ownership is not at arms-length)[5].    Further, for-profit services are found by the ACCC to be of worse average quality[6] than that provided by not-for-profit providers.  The Productivity Commission should be making recommendations about compulsory and regular financial accountability. I believe that, in Australia as in Canada, child care is fundamentally a public service (with about 80% of costs paid by the public purse) but one that is delivered by private operators. Detailed and regular reporting on how public moneys are spent should be an obvious requirement.

    7. The final report of the Productivity Commission should lay out a 10- to 20-year vision for the establishment of universal child care services in Australia.  The recommended National Partnership Agreement would be a part of this plan.  Wrap-around child care for preschools would be a part of this plan.  The expansion of supply-side funding of services with fees controlled would be part of this plan.  The new independent ECEC Commission would monitor and report on progress towards universal access and make ongoing recommendations to move towards it.  The Productivity Commission hints at a long-term vision but is not explicit.  This allows the Productivity Commission to duck a lot of longer-term questions about affordability, commercialization of the system, financial accountability, and generally the evolution towards serving public interests better.

    8. Australia has a long-established demand-side (voucher) funding system for child care.  It allows providers to set their own fees, decide on staff compensation conditional on meeting the award levels set by the Fair Work Commission, choose the children and parents they will serve from those who apply and choose the hours of service to provide.  This is not, in my opinion, the best system going forward; I believe that a system of supply-side-funded services with a guaranteed set fee level (plus fees reduced below the set-fee level or to zero for some families) would be better.  However, changing funding systems is not easy and there is often a lot of push-back from those in the system.  Why not think outside the box? Why not establish an alternative supply-side funding system that would exist in parallel with the existing demand-side funding system with incentives for centres to switch? 

    Centres that were funded on the supply-side would have a fixed fee, and enhanced regulatory requirements.  In exchange, they would have guaranteed funding to cover costs above parent fees. Set-fees that are known and predictable are very popular with parents at all income levels and, in Quebec, have encouraged high child care participation by children in lower-income families.  There would be strong elements of financial accountability and reporting by centres, requirements to pay above-award wages, reduced ability to rely on part-time and casual staff and other requirements related to quality of care, but some centres and some parents would prefer this.  There would be obvious transition difficulties, but this kind of recommendation would boldly look towards transforming Australia’s system into a universal and affordable one.

    9. The Productivity Commission does not address the increasing commercialization of child care services in Australia.  Virtually all of the expansion of centre-based child care services (not preschools) in the last decade – a 50% increase in the number of spaces available – has been in the for-profit sector.  As the ACCC interim report notes: “the child care sector is widely viewed as a safe and strong investment with guaranteed returns, backed by a government safety net.” The Productivity Commission report does not even raise the question of whether this extremely unbalanced growth pattern is desirable. The growth in services that has occurred is disproportionately located where returns are higher, rather than where need is greater, as shown in Figures 3 and 7 of the draft report.  1% of providers now provide 35% of all centre-based child care services. The Productivity Commission should be making recommendations about means of encouraging growth in not-for-profit and public provision of services.  These recommendations would call for planned development and dedicated loan guarantees or other capital funding targeted at not-for-profit providers.  I believe that Australian children and families are unlikely to prefer a universal child care system with unplanned expansion and complete domination of service provision by commercial incentives and ethics.

    10. The Productivity Commission draft report provides a one-sided summary of the experience and effects of Quebec’s universal child care system.  Although it is true that economic researchers found short-run negative effects on some children (effects were found to vary substantially across different child groups[7]), the most recent and comprehensive work on Quebec, using a triple-difference estimator similar to other studies (Montpetit et al., 2024[8]) does not find any long-run negative effects on children’s completed education.  Rather, they find that the long-run education levels of Quebec children who had been eligible for $5 a day child care were no different than their peers in other parts of Canada.  In particular they write: “We find no evidence of negative effects on educational attainment of eligible children in the long-run. This pattern is true for each educational level, namely for university, high school, and college completion….

    The results suggest a positive but statistically insignificant impact on completion of a university degree, the most comparable outcome across provinces, and no impact at lower levels.”(p. 21).  Further, Montpetit’s study calculates the social cost of increased “youth criminal activity” identified by Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2019[9]) and finds negligible social costs because the identified transgressions were minor. 

    11. The Productivity Commission draft report gives little sense that this fixed-parent-fee child care program is an incredibly popular social program with Quebec parents.  The reader will struggle to understand why the Canadian federal government decided in 2021 to spend $30 billion over 5 years to spread the Quebec child care model of a fixed-fee, supply-side-funded program across the country.  The reader of the draft report will not be told that Quebec’s child care reforms had sufficient impacts on mothers’ employment and economic growth to more than pay for the costs of the program according to the influential opinion of prominent Canadian economists (Fortin, Godbout, St. Cerny, 2013[10]).  Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008[11]) find that Quebec’s policy reforms increased labour force participation of mothers with children 0-4 by 7.6 percentage points from 61.4%  before the policy.  They estimate the labour force elasticity to child care price to be 0.25.  In addition the child care reforms increased the annual hours worked, weeks worked and earnings; these elasticities were 0.26, 0.28, and 0.34, respectively.  With these elasticities, a 10% decrease in the fee would increase annual hours worked by 2.6%, increase weeks worked by 2.8% or increase earnings by 3.4% on average.

    Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete (2009[12]) found that the labour force impacts lasted beyond the preschool child care years when mothers no longer had any children 0-5 years of age, and that the positive labour force impacts were particularly strong amongst mothers with lower levels of education. Even if long run labour force effects are ignored, the recent study by Montpetit and colleagues (2024) finds that the overall benefits of universal child care in Quebec are three and a half times the costs.  This includes a careful evaluation of the value of the improvements in the well-being of Quebec mothers from universal child care services.

    12. The Quebec model of funding and management of child care services is not a perfect one.  Two factors made its birth particularly difficult.  First, when they initiated the $5 a day program, Quebec only had enough child care supply to provide services to 15% of the child population 0-4 years.  For 20 years, they scrambled to increase supply and have now reached nearly 70%. However, this scramble to increase supply meant relying too heavily on both family child care and for-profit child care with weaker regulation.  These types of care have been the Achilles heel of quality[13] in the Quebec system, a problem that is now being addressed.  Second, this was a program funded exclusively by the provincial government; at that time, the federal government was unwilling to provide any financial support.  The provincial governments in Canada have modest taxing powers, so services were not as generously funded as they should have been.  With the federal government coming to the table in 2021 with billions of dollars of additional funding, child care services in Quebec will now be funded more appropriately.  I have described the problems of the Quebec model of child care here[14], warts and all.   However, these problems are not inherent in a universal program; Australia already has a large child care supply and substantial financial resources available to support good quality programming. It can gain the substantial benefits of Quebec’s universal program without the birth pangs that Quebec has faced.

    Commentators have noted that low-income families in Quebec do not have as much access to good quality child care as do middle income families.  That is true and is a problem. As far as I can tell, that is true and is a problem in most countries whether child care systems are universal or not; it is certainly true in Australia[15]. However under Quebec’s universal program it is also true that a much higher percentage of low-income families were able to access licensed child care than was the case with the targeted funding that predominated in the rest of Canada[16].  Children from low-income families also were particularly likely to benefit from their access to early childhood programs[17].

    13. The terms of reference of the Productivity Commission enquiry require that it study “the operation and adequacy of the market, including types of care and the roles of for-profit and not-for-profit providers, and the appropriate role for government.” Further, these terms of reference direct that “The Commission should have regard to any findings from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Price Inquiry into child care prices….”   However, the findings in the ACCC draft report about the child care industry scarcely get any mention, including differences in costs and priorities of for-profit and not-for-profit providers.  The ACCC report provides important insights about costs and performance not available elsewhere.

    14. I hope that many of these issues will be addressed directly in the final report of the Productivity Commission.

    Gordon Cleveland, Ph.D.,
    Associate Professor of Economics Emeritus,
    Department of Management,
    University of Toronto Scarborough

    FOOTNOTES/ENDNOTES

    [1] These policy changes -removing activity requirements for 3 day attendance and 100% subsidy up to $80,000 -should mean many more lower-income families wanting access to child care.  Some operators prefer to serve a more exclusive clientele; this is known as creaming.  Under current rules, centres that charge a fee that is above the maximum hourly-fee limit are likely to effectively exclude most of these children.  Perhaps the Productivity Commission should require that centres be compelled to serve these children at the maximum hourly fee if parents apply to attend.

    [2] The cost of child care in Australia is pretty high.  Centre-based child care fees per hour (averaged across ages 0-5) were $11.72 in 2022.  The Productivity Commission reports that the average daily fee is $124 per day.   From 2018 to 2022, gross fees in Australia increased by 20.6% in comparison to the OECD average of 9.5%.  The OECD ranks Australia as 26th out of 32 countries on affordability of child care for a typical couple family with two children.  This is despite the Australian Government contribution to fees being significantly higher than most other OECD countries – 16% in Australia compared to the OECD average of 7%.

    [3] See https://childcarepolicy.net/cost-controls-and-supply-side-funding-what-does-quebec-do/ for a discussion of details of child care funding in Quebec and see https://childcarepolicy.net/new-zealands-funding-system-for-early-childhood-education-and-care-services/ for a discussion of details of child care funding in New Zealand.

    [4] See Connolly, M., Mélanie-Fontaine, M. & Haeck, C. (2023). Child Penalties in Canada.   Canadian Public Policy doi:10.3138/cpp.2023-015.  See also Karademir, S., J.-W. Laliberté, and S. Staubli. (2023). “The Multigenerational Impact of Children and Childcare Policies.” IZA Discussion Papers No. 15894, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn, Germany.  As Karademir et al indicate “The disproportionate impact of children on women’s earnings constitutes the primary factor contributing to persistent gender inequality in many countries.”

    [5] Land and occupancy costs are about 18% of the total of all costs for large for-profit providers compared to about 10% for large not-for-profit providers. This is not due to what the Aussies call “peppercorn rents” (i.e., below-market rents provided on a goodwill basis).  The average profit margin for large centre based day care providers was about 9% for for-profit providers and about 6% for not-for- profit providers in 2022. 

    [6] About 95% of the staff in not-for-profit centres are paid “above-award” compared to 64% in for-profit centres.  Not-for-profit providers are much more likely to hire their staff on a full-time basis, whereas for-profit providers primarily rely on part-time staff.  As the ACCC report suggests: “large not-for-profit centre-based day care providers invest savings from lower land costs into labour costs, to improve the quality of their services and their ability to compete in their relevant markets.”  The ACCC finds that centre-based day care services with a higher proportion of staff paid above award and with lower staff turnover have a higher quality rating under the National Quality Standard. 

    [7] Kottelenberg and Lehrer provide evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the impacts of the Quebec child care reforms by the age of the child, the child’s gender and by initial abilities in a series of studies published in 2013, 2014, 2017 and 2018.  Kottelenberg, M. J. and Lehrer, S. F. (2013). New evidence on the impacts of access to and attending universal child-care in Canada. Canadian Public Policy, 39(2):263–286. Kottelenberg, M. J. and Lehrer, S. F. (2014). Do the perils of universal childcare depend on the child’s age? CESifo Economic Studies, 60(2):338–365. Kottelenberg, M. J. and Lehrer, S. F. (2017). Targeted or universal coverage? assessing heterogeneity in the effects of universal child care. Journal of Labor Economics, 35(3):609–653. Kottelenberg, M. J. and Lehrer, S. F. (2018). Does Quebec’s subsidized child care policy give boys and girls an equal start? Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’ ́economique, 51(2):627–659. Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2017) finds that levels and changes in home learning environments by some parents in response to the Quebec reforms were an important explanatory factor of differential effects on children.

    [8] Montpetit, S., Beauregard, P., & Carrer, L. (2024). A Welfare Analysis of Universal Childcare: Lessons From a Canadian Reformhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1dDWvj2e08YodXAWd5zdmBKP3j-kxt1Uj/view

    [9] Baker M., Gruber J., & Milligan K. (2019). The Long-Run Impacts of a Universal Child Care Program American Economic Journal. Economic Policy, Vol.11 (3), p.1-26; American Economic Association.

    [10] Fortin, P., Godbout, L. and St.Cerny, S.. (2013). “Impacts of Quebec’s Universal Low-fee Childcare Program on Female Labour Force Participation, Domestic Income and Government Budgets. University of Toronto. Toronto, ON.  Translated from French https://www.oise.utoronto.ca/home/sites/default/files/2024-02/impact-of-quebec-s-universal-low-fee-childcare-program-on-female-labour-force-participation.pdf  Original reference is Fortin, P., Godbout, L., and St-Cerny, S. (2013). L’impact des services de garde a contribution reduite du quebec sur le taux d’activite feminin, le revenu interieur et les budgets gouvernementaux. Revue Interventions economiques. Papers in Political Economy, 47.

    [11] Lefebvre, P., Merrigan, P. (2008). Childcare policy and the labor supply of mothers with young children: a natural experiment from Canada. Journal of Labor Economics 23, 519–548.

    [12] Lefebvre, P., Merrigan, P., Verstraete, M. (2009) Dynamic Labour Supply Effects of Childcare Subsidies: Evidence from a Canadian Natural Experiment on Low-fee Universal Child Care.  Labour Economics 16: 490-502.

    [13] Couillard, K. (2018) Early Childhood: The Quality of Educational Childcare Services in Quebec. Observatoire des tout-petits. Montreal, Quebec, Fondation Lucie et André Chagnon.  Page 25 of this document charts the measured quality differences between CPEs (not-for-profit centres) and the for-profit non-subsidized daycares.  In the CPEs that are the heart of the supply-side funded system, in two age categories, 4% or fewer of centre rooms are of poor quality.  In the for-profit child care centres funded by demand-side tax credits to quickly boost supply, 36%-41% are of poor quality.

    [14] Cleveland, G., Mathieu, S., and Japel, C. (2021) What is “the Quebec Model” of Early Learning and Child Care? Policy Options, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal QC. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/february-2021/what-is-the-quebec-model-of-early-learning-and-child-care/#:~:text=The%20plan%20in%20Quebec%20was,educational%20child%20care%20after%20that.

    [15] See Cloney, D., Cleveland, G., Hattie, J., and Tayler, C. (2016) Variations in the Availability and Quality of Early Childhood Education and Care by Socioeconomic Status of Neighborhoods Early Education and Development Vol. 27(3 ):384 – 401, and also see : Australian Children’s Education and Care Quality Authority (ACECQA) (2020) Quality ratings by socio-economic status of areas, ACECQA, Sydney

    [16] Cleveland, G. (2017) “What is the Role of Early Childhood Education and Care in an Equality Agenda?” pp. 75-98 in Robert J. Brym ed. Income Inequality and the Future of Canadian Society ISBN-13:978-1-77244-044-7 Oakville, ON: Rock’s Mills Press. Proceedings of the inaugural S.D.Clark memorial symposium.

    [17] Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2017) op. cit.

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    What  the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Can Tell Us About For-Profit Child Care

    What would Canada’s child care system look like if we let it be dominated by for-profit child care providers?  Particularly with Pierre Poilievre lurking in the wings, it’s an interesting question to ask.

    So, into my inbox arrives a fascinating study from what they call the “A triple-C” (ACCC) or Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.  When the new Labor Prime Minister of Australia – Anthony Albanese – arrived in office in 2022, he commissioned two big studies of child care.  He asked the ACCC to examine how well or badly the market for child care was working.  And he asked the Productivity Commission – a permanent body rather like the old Economic Council of Canada – to report on how best to make child care universally accessible and affordable in Australia.

    Both of these bodies have now produced Interim Reports.  This blog post will comment on the one from the ACCC.  The ACCC report focuses on the cost of producing child care services, the nature of competition in child care markets and the effectiveness of Australian government attempts to regulate child care fees.

    You don’t want to read the whole report, so let me cherry-pick some findings for you.

    • The cost of child care in Australia is pretty high.  Centre-based child care fees per hour (averaged across ages 0-5) were $11.72 in 2022 or $117.20 for a 10-hour day. 
    • Australia’s Child Care Subsidy system (like a tax credit for child care expenses) costs the government a lot but does not make child care affordable.  For a couple on average wages with 2 children (aged 2 and 3) in centre based day care full-time, net child care costs came to 16% of net household income in 2022. In contrast, the average for OECD countries was 9%, with Australia ranked 26th out of 32 countries. This is despite the Australian Government contribution to fees being significantly higher than most other OECD countries – 16% in Australia compared to the OECD average of 7%.
    • From 2018 to 2022, gross fees in Australia increased by 20.6% in comparison to the OECD average of 9.5%.
    • Looking at detailed data on the cost of producing centre-based child care for children younger than school age, 69% was accounted for by labour costs, 15% by land/occupancy, and 9% by finance and administration costs.  But these proportions are quite a bit different for for-profit and not-for-profit providers.  69% of centre-based child care services in Australia are provided by for-profit operators.
    • Land and occupancy costs are about 18% of the total of all costs for large for-profit providers compared to about 10% for large not-for-profit providers. This is not due to what the Aussies call “peppercorn rents” (i.e., below-market rents provided on a goodwill basis).  As the ACCC report says, this may be due to non-arms-length transactions in land rental of for-profit providers (to be investigated in the final report).
    • Not-for-profit child care operators pay a higher proportion in labour costs for two reasons.  They are much more likely to pay “above-award” wages – in other words, wages that are above the minimums set by the Fair Work Commission wage grid.  About 95% of the staff in not-for-profit centres are paid “above-award” compared to 64% in for-profit centres.  The second reason is that not-for-profit providers are much more likely to hire their staff on a full-time basis, whereas for-profit providers primarily rely on part-time staff.  As the report suggests: “large not-for-profit centre-based day care providers invest savings from lower land costs into labour costs, to improve the quality of their services and their ability to compete in their relevant markets.”  The ACCC finds that centre-based day care services with a higher proportion of staff paid above award and with lower staff turnover have a higher quality rating under the National Quality Standard. 
    • The ACCC finds that parents and guardians typically prefer centr- based day care services located close to their home. Most households travel a short distance to child care – between 2 and 3 kilometres.
    • Parents’ and guardians’ perception of quality is a key factor driving decisions for selecting a child care service. As child care is an ‘experience good’, meaning it is difficult to accurately determine quality of a child care service without having used it, parents and guardians appear to rely on informal measures of quality over formal National Quality Standard ratings.
    • Providers’ decisions to establish child care centres are highly influenced by expectations of profitability within a particular area or market, which are driven by expectations of demand and willingness to pay. The willingness to pay for child care within a local area is heavily influenced by household incomes, as this influences the opportunity costs of not using child care services. These factors encourage supply to markets where demand for child care is highest, and parents and guardians are likely willing to pay higher prices. In particular, for-profit providers are more likely to supply these markets as the opportunity for profit is greater.
    • These markets tend to be in metropolitan areas of higher socio-economic advantage. This higher demand and greater willingness to pay explains why we find operating margins are higher in areas of higher socio-economic advantage and Major Cities of Australia.  The child care sector is widely viewed as a safe and strong investment with guaranteed returns, backed by a government safety net
    • While providers’ supply decisions are generally driven by considerations of viability, we note that there are providers that supply some services at a loss. This reflects that – like many other human services – child care plays an important societal role. This results in not-for- profit providers accounting for a greater proportion of services in areas of very low advantage.
    • The nature of child care markets and the role played by price, as well as the impact of the Child Care Subsidy, also mean it is unlikely that market forces alone will act as an effective constraint on prices to ensure affordability for households (including households with low incomes and vulnerable cohorts) and to minimise the burden on taxpayers.
    • Large for-profit providers of centre based day care have consistently had higher profit and operating margins than not-for-profits since 2018. The average profit margin for large centre based day care providers was about 9% for for-profit providers and about 6% for not-for- profit providers in 2022.

    In conclusion, the ACCC sees substantial benefit in a detailed consideration of supply-side models, the role of market stewardship and direct price controls for child care services. There will be a final report from the ACCC soon.

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    British Columbia’s New Spaces Funding Program

    My opinion of British Columbia’s New Spaces Fund is shaped by the context.   It’s a valuable, if imperfect, source of capital funding for the expansion of not-for-profit and public child care.

    The context is that we’re not doing a good job in expanding the availability of child care services in Canada.  That’s disappointing, of course, but also a danger to the ultimate success of the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care program. 

    Without rapidly expanded capacity, most parents will not be able to benefit from $10 a day child care.  Women will not be able to enter the labour force.  The economic growth benefits of child care will not happen.  Parents will be angry and frustrated at governments that have promised them services they can’t deliver.  A new government may come in and turn everything over to the for-profit sector, loosening staffing regulations, and allowing operators to surcharge parents for “extras” to make providing child care more profitable. 

    The decision of federal and provincial/territorial governments to rely on the not-for-profit and public sectors for child care capacity was good for the long-run, but it’s having lots of problems in the short run.  Not-for-profit and public services are typically of higher quality with better effects on children’s lives.  Not-for-profit and public services become trustworthy community assets, here for the long term, in a way that for-profits do not, always anxious to sell assets or property to the highest bidder. 

    But, not-for-profits need more help to expand than the for-profits do. For-profits have better access to capital funding from the private sector than not-for-profits do; many banks and financial institutions are unwilling to make construction loans and mortgages to not-for-profit organizations.  Most not-for-profit organizations find it too risky to make expansion promises until future on-going operational funding arrangements for services are settled;  some for-profit organizations are willing to take a gamble that future operational funding will be generous, or that costs can be slashed to ensure a profit.   On top of all this is the shortage of qualified early childhood educators.  Not-for-profits are typically unwilling to expand until they can hire enough fully-qualified educators to run good-quality programs.  For-profits are often willing to plan to operate without a full complement of trained staff, hoping they can get exemptions from government regulations and be able to operate with unqualified staff.

    British Columbia’s New Spaces Fund is not perfect.  Yet, in the context I’ve just described, it provides some important support for child care expansion to not-for-profit and public organizations in B.C.  And that’s a lot more than I can say for most of Canada’s provinces, outside Quebec.  The New Spaces program provides capital grants only to not-for-profit and public organizations who are willing and anxious to expand the supply of child care services.  Previously, it was available to the for-profit sector who did not need it; that was a big mistake that has since been corrected. The budget last year was $292 million, about $84 million from provincial funds and the rest from federal funding under the Canada-Wide ELCC program. 

    Some of the projects are for minor renovations, some for equipment only, but some are for much bigger projects.  The new Ministry of Education and Child Care prefers to have projects that are funded for $40,000 or less per space, but this restriction can be waived.  Since, construction costs have been rising rapidly, $40,000 per space is now below full cost for many projects.  And applicants are expected to come up with 10% of the entire project cost from other sources. 

    It’s also a one-time capital grant, so you have to know a lot of detailed cost and design elements up-front when you apply.  At the time you apply, you are guessing at much of this.  This is a disadvantage.  A capital program, instead of a one-time capital grant, can be more flexible.

    Eligible costs for the New Spaces program include project management, design/engineering costs and site evaluations, architect and accountant fees, and business planning development (business case model and analysis).  Also eligible are infrastructure costs – water, sewer, roads, sidewalks.  And equipment. And GST/PST and a 10% contingency.)  Not included are costs of purchasing real estate, or buildings or commercial space (however, modular buildings to be erected on site are an eligible expenditure).

    Many of the applicants for New Spaces funding are local governments, school boards, health district authorities, public post-secondary institutions, and First Nations. This is a great use of the program.  Many of these bodies may have access to land for building, and many will have considerable experience in managing large development projects.

    The New Spaces Fund is application-driven.  In other words, organizations have to take the initiative and plan child care expansion and apply for capital funding.  The New Spaces Fund is therefore a capital grants program, it is not part of a program of capital expansion.  In many ways, this is a weakness and this feature has been criticized.  Advocates say that B.C. needs planned child care expansion, focused first on areas of higher need, with support for many aspects of expansion – not just capital grants.  Most child care centres do not have the resources to take on major capital development, raising millions of dollars of capital funding and managing multi-year expansion projects.  Capital expansion requires more than just money. It needs organizations that will take responsibility for development; it needs architects with knowledge of child care,  it needs design standards.  It also needs a much longer guarantee that facilities will stay in place than the current 10-year requirement of the New Spaces Fund.   Manitoba’s Ready-to-Move program is a model to look at for how resources of different actors can be mobilized for child care expansion.

    While that’s true, let’s give B.C. some kudos for having a program of capital grants at all.  Believe it or not, most provinces apparently believe that (capital) money grows on trees (for not-for-profit and public organizations).   Alberta offers $5,000- $6,000 per space.  Ontario offers about $7,000 per space.  In the context where the cost of new-build construction is often more like $50,000-$60,000 per space, that’s not a serious amount of capital assistance.

    B.C. has much to do.  They are planning development of a wage grid to attract early childhood educators, but there is no deadline for when this will happen. 

    B.C. has not yet developed a funding formula for the provision of operational funding when parent fees are an average of $10 a day for everyone.  This means that future revenue streams are uncertain, so the planning of child care expansion for not-for-profit and public services is more risky than it needs to be.

    B.C. has not yet developed mechanisms for planning and guiding the child care expansion that will have to happen.  Based on current use patterns in Quebec where parent fees are now $8.75 a day, we can expect that B.C. will need to have  spaces for 174,180 children 0-5.  That would mean a need for about 77,750 additional child care spaces compared to 2021.  So, B.C. needs to get its game on.  As many other provinces do.

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    Do You Want to Know How to Make Child Care Expansion Happen in Ontario?

    I’m done some work recently with Building Blocks for Child Care (B2C2) on how to facilitate the expansion of not-for-profit and public child care in Ontario. They are an organization that knows a lot about all the different steps necessary to expand child care services – planning, design, rules and regulations, financing. With their advice, I wrote a primer called How to Make Child Care Expansion Happen in Ontario, giving 10 recommendations for action in Ontario to make not-for-profit and public child care grow.

    Briefly, they are:

    1. A system of capital grants and loan guarantees for not-for-profit and public operators
    2. Creating public planning mechanisms with provincial, municipal, school board and community members
    3. An inventory of publicly-owned lands and buildings suitable for child care expansion
    4. Mandate where possible the co-location of licensed child care services whenever business and housing developments happen
    5. Explore the use of Land Trusts to preserve the preservation of child care assets in public hands for future generations
    6. Use provincial legislation and regulations to control transfers of child care assets and ensure they are not controlled by big-box corporate child care chains
    7. Early guarantees of operational funding and licensing of not-for-profit and public operators that plan expansion following public plans.
    8. Development and implementation of a province-wide salary and benefits grid and much more funding to increase compensation of educators and other staff. Recruitment and retention of qualified educators is Job #1.
    9. Transparent and effective future funding guidelines to support expansion. Assistance to municipalities to implement financial accountability measures in a long-term funding model.
    10. Public funding of organizations such as B2C2 that support not-for-profit operators to negotiate hurdles associated with expansion of child care services.

    It’s not rocket science. These are some obvious steps to help the necessary expansion of not-for-profit and public child care services. Parents and children will suffer when expansion doesn’t happen. Soon there will be long waiting lists to get into child care facilities in Ontario if the government does not act now.

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    Give Them an Inch and They’ll Take a Mile: The Story of For-Profit Child Care in Ontario

    The Ministry of Education in Ontario is beginning to understand that they really can’t satisfy for-profit child care providers with anything less than the full cake and eat it too.  The Ontario government has bent over backwards to accommodate the for-profit child care operators; they want them to opt into the Canada-wide Early Learning and Child Care (CWELCC) system.  What has the Ministry done so far for the for-profit operators?

    • It changed the regulations so that municipalities (mandated to be Service System Managers) no longer have the discretion to sign purchase-of-service agreements only with not-for-profit providers (16 of the 47 had this type of provision);
    • It changed regulations so that measurement of quality in a centre could not be used as a criterion for eligiblity for CWELCC sign-up;
    • It completely gutted the new Management and Funding Guidelines for 2022 which the Ministry itself had established back in April.  The April version of the guidelines affirmed that municipalities should judge whether the funds given to operators in 2022 were based on actual costs.  In other words, the municipalities should judge whether operators had ineligible expenditures or excesssive profit claims.  The August Guidelines eliminated these provisions.
    • It ordered municipalities to collect very little financial data from operators.  The April version of the Guidelines said that “CMSMs/DSSABs are required to collect sufficient and detailed financial information from Licensees…. CMSMs/DSSABs will review all financial components including cost and expense line items for reasonability and eligibility, while ensuring CWELCC System objectives will be achieved….”  The August version of the Guidelines said “Information collected from Licensees to support implementation should be kept to the minimum amount necessary to meet the reporting requirements outlined in the CWELCC Guidelines….”

    As of October 18th, the Ministry of Education has announced that the August 2022 Guidelines will continue for 2023; there will be few controls over how child care operators spend the revenues they receive from the CWELCC program.  Information collection will be kept to a minimum.  All of this despite the fact that, with a 50% cut in fees at the end of 2022, more than twice as much government money will be going to operators.

    Ontario’s Action Plan (part of the CWELCC Agreement with the federal government) said there would be a revised allocation methodology in 2023.  That didn’t happen. Now, the new costs-based funding system will be in place for 2024.

    But that’s not enough concessions as far as the for-profit operators are concerned.  They want more.  Sharon Siriboe, the director of the Ontario Association of Independent Childcare Centres wants guaranteed funding rules before for-profit operators will join the system.  “How can any small business remain viable and be asked to make such significant changes with only 14 months of clarity?”

    What is the problem here?

    Ontario signed an agreement with the federal government back in late March of 2022 – the Ontario-Canada Canada-wide Early Learning and Child Care Agreement.  In it, Ontario committed itself to the vision of building a largely not-for-profit system of accessible, affordable, inclusive child care services of high quality with federal money – $10 Billion of it over 4 years.

    In Section 4.1 of that agreement, it states that “Ontario intends to maintain and build upon its existing robust accountability framework by introducing a further control mechanism. Ontario proposes to implement a cost control framework following the signing of the agreement that will be in place for all providers that opt into the Canada-wide ELCC system. The Parties are interested in approaches to ensure the sound and reasonable use of public funds, ensuring that costs and earnings of child care licensees that opt-in to the Canada-wide ELCC system are reasonable and that surplus earnings beyond reasonable earnings are directed towards improving child care services.”  

    I don’t really like calling it a “cost control framework”.  It would be better to call it a “wise spending of public dollars” framework.  The objective is not to have costs that are as low as possible; the objective is to spend public dollars sensibly to achieve the objectives of affordability, accessibility and quality.  Ontario has agreed with the federal government that there will be a mechanism that ensures that all providers spend public funds wisely and that both the costs claimed by these providers and the earnings (profit) claimed by these providers are reasonable in achieving the objectives of this new child care system.

    What is this new cost control/wise spending of public dollars framework?   Ontario tries to claim they have one already, but they don’t.  They have what we could call a fee control framework.  In other words, base fees for every operator are frozen at whatever their value was on March 27, 2022.  Each operator will get revenue from government equal to 25% of this base fee if they join CWELCC in 2022.  The operator will use these funds to backdate a 25% fee reduction to parents.  There will be another cut to fees at the end of December.  This will take fees down by 50% compared to the level they had in 2020. And, in 2023, operators will get revenues from government to cover these fee reductions for parents.  These rules control the fees charged by operators, but they in no way validate the costs and earnings that are covered by the new government revenues.  There is effectively no reporting on what these costs and earnings are.  There is no way to calculate the amount of surplus taken by operators, or to see how it is used.

    That’s the way the for-profit operators like it.  No requirement for reporting on how the public funds they receive are spent until well into 2024.  Even then, only a requirement for an annual audit. No need to justify the salaries paid to management.  No need to justify the profits they claim each year, which are built into the fees they charge.  We know from the CCPA fees survey that for-profit operators in cities across Ontario charge higher fees than not-for-profits.  Their median fees are between 8% and 40% higher than the not-for-profits, depending on the municipality. Why?  Are these fee (and revenue) differentials justified?  The for-profit sector would prefer not to tell.  They don’t want detailed accountability for the public funds they receive.

    I have recently argued that the Ministry of Education should be requiring all operators in 2023 to submit detailed budgets of planned expenditures.  These would be reconciled against actual spending (and profit) at the end of the year.  This, along with related operating data, could provide the detailed costs and spending information the Ministry of Education would need to design a new costs-based funding system.  But the Ministry doesn’t want to do that.  Instead they are giving the for-profit child care operators a free pass for another year.  The Ministry plans to develop a new costs-based funding system for 2024 with virtually no costs data upon which to build it.  And, the for-profit operators are even objecting to this.  They apparently want the free pass to continue for ever.

    Why, you might wonder?  From an economic point of view, the position of the for-profit operators is quite rational.  They have a licence to provide child care services in Ontario and many of them make good money providing these services.  From now on, having a licence to provide child care services to children 0-5 in Ontario is going to mean receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in guaranteed government funding; by September 2025, government-provided revenues will cover over 80% of the per-child costs of most centres. Access to this kind of government funding is scarce; not everyone can get a licence   In a similar situation in Quebec, some fixed-fee centres have been able to sell their licences to new operators for over a million dollars.  That’s not selling equipment or real estate; that’s just the price of buying the licence.  In Ontario, the fewer the reporting requirements, the fewer the controls over how operators spend their money, the fewer the controls on profit, the higher will be the price when you come to sell your licence.  Large big-box for-profit child care chains may be willing to pay top dollar for existing licences of small for-profit operators if there are very few controls on the reasonableness of costs and earnings.  So, the demands of the for-profit operators are rational; they’re just not very good for Ontario children, families and for the building of a financially accountable child care system.